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How Algorithmic Trading
Undermines Efficiency in
Capital Markets
Yesha Yadav*
This Article argues that the rise of algorithmic trading undermines
efficient capital allocation in securities markets. It is a bedrock assumption in
theory that securities prices reveal how effectively public companies utilize
capital. This conventional wisdom rests on the straightforward premise that
prices reflect available information about a security and that investors look to
prices to decide where to invest and whether their capital is being productively
used. Unsurprisingly, regulation relies pervasively on prices as a proxy for the
allocative efficiency of investor capital.
Algorithmic trading weakens the ability of prices to function as a
window into allocative efficiency. This Article develops two lines of argument.
First, algorithmic markets evidence a systemic degree of model risk-the risk
that stylized programming and financial modeling fails to capture the messy
details of real-world trading. By design, algorithms rely on pre-set
programming and modeling to function. Traders must predict how markets
might behave and program their algorithms accordingly in advance of trading,
and this anticipatory dynamic creates steep costs. Building algorithms capable
of predicting future markets presents a near-impossible proposition, making
gaps and errors inevitable. These uncertainties create incentives for traders to
focus efforts on markets where prediction is likely to be most successful, i.e.,
short-term markets that have limited relevance for capital allocation. Secondly,
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informed traders, long regarded as critical to filling gaps in information and
supplying markets with insight, have fewer incentives to participate in
algorithmic markets and to correct these and other informational deficits.
Competing with high-speed, algorithmic counterparts, informed traders can see
lower returns from their engagement. When informed traders lose interest in
bringing insights to securities trading, prices are less rich as a result.
This argument has significant implications for regulation that views
prices as providing an essential window into allocative efficiency. Broad swaths
of regulation across corporate governance and securities regulation rely on
prices as a mechanism to monitor and discipline public companies. As
algorithmic trading creates costs for capital allocation, this reliance must also
be called into question. In concluding, this Article outlines pathways for reform
to better enable securities markets to fulfill their fundamental purpose:
efficiently allocating capital to the real economy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2012, traders in the United States submitted over two billion
offers to buy and sell securities on major national exchanges, resulting
in around seventy-four million completed trades. As a point of
comparison, at the height of the internet boom in 2000, traders sent out
only around five million quotes and, from these, concluded three million
trades. In other words, in 2012, traders were submitting almost 460
times the number of quotes than they did in 2000. Rather than reaching
a bargain 60% of the time, as was the case in 2000, traders did so in just
3% of cases in 2012, sending out more than thirty-one quotes for every
completed trade.1 An uptick in trading appetite over the years is almost
certainly not an explanation for this staggering rise in the number of
orders. 2 Rather, these statistics are indicative of a much larger and
more fundamental transformation underway in U.S. markets.
Reflecting the rise of computer technology, today's marketplace has
come to rely heavily on automation and algorithms as an essential part
of the trading process. In place of humans submitting orders and
routing and processing trades, firms can delegate these tasks to
algorithms, computerized instructions that transact in accordance with
1. Friends Without Benefits, NANEx (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.nanex.net/aqck2/3528.html
[http://perma.cclNL6W-PBTB]. These figures show quotes on the New York Stock Exchange
(NASDAQ), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and ARCA. They likely underreport the quotes
on all US trading systems. These exchanges, while significant trading venues, are still a partial
segment of the US marketplace that includes numerous regulated exchanges as well as
unregulated venues, like dark pools.
2. For example, the Financial Crisis in 2007 caused disruptions in securities trading in the
market and prompted adjustments in the volume of stock trading owing to volatility. For
discussion, see, for example, Tarun Chordia, Asani Sarkar, and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam,
Common Determinants of Bond and Stock Market Liquidity: The Impact of Financial Crises,
Monetary Policy, and Mutual Fund Flows (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 141, 2001),
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff reports/srl4l.pdf [http://perma.cc/X5JM-3ULA]
(observing, in general, the higher volatility in times of financial crisis and impact on money
supply); Dan Strumpf, Wall Street Adjusts to the New Trading Normal, WALL ST. J. (June 6, 2014),
http://www.wsj.comlarticles/wall-street-adjusts-to-the-new-trading-normal-1401910990
[http://perma.cc/C5RX-GCVL] (noting a peak volume of trades in 2009, at the height of the
Financial Crisis, with almost two billion shares in Citigroup and Bank of America being traded
daily); Azi Ben-Rephael, Flight to Liquidity in the Equity Markets during Periods of Financial
Crisis (Jan. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.1se.ac.uk/fmg/researchProgrammes/
paulWoolleyCentre/events/4thAnnualConference/S2_ABenRephaelPaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/
9QRX-YERH] (noting the behavior of certain key investors in times of crisis and the pressure to
buy and sell securities).
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a firm's pre-set strategy.3 Untethered from the limitations of human
cognition, algorithms enable trades to occur at high speed and high
volume using pre-programmed decision rules to identify trading
opportunities. With the aid of algorithms, traders can deploy a more
powerful array of quantitative techniques, statistics, and financial
modeling as part of the buying and selling process than previously
possible.4
These changes prompt fresh reflection about the ability of
markets to continue to perform their most basic function: supplying
capital to the real economy. In both law and finance, scholars have
debated market function and regulation through the lens of efficiency.5
How well markets are able to reflect information in securities prices
often serves as a proxy as a rough-and-ready measure of market
health. 6 It is easy to understand why; efficient markets help investors
cheaply investigate the most optimal destination for their capital.7
When prices reflect information accurately, investors can assess their
risks and rewards more precisely and better direct their capital to the
most worthwhile investments-showcasing allocative efficiency.8 While
predicting the future performance and intrinsic "value" of investments
is near impossible, informational efficiency offers a mechanism, albeit
an imprecise one, to make beneficial allocative choices with the
information at hand.9 Better informed markets can help capital to reach
those companies and areas of the economy that are likely to use it most
3. THOMAS H. CORMEN ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO ALGORITHMS, 5-6 (3d ed. 2009)
("Informally, an algorithm is any well-defined computational procedure that takes some value, or
set of values, as input and produces some value, or set of values, as output. An algorithm is thus
a sequence of computational steps that transform the input into the output."); see also John Bates,
Algorithmic Trading and High Frequency Trading Experiences and Thoughts on Regulatory
Requirements, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 19 (July 14, 2010),
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/tac_071410_binder.pdf
[http://perma.cc/949A-VB6A] ("An algorithm is a sequence of steps to achieve a goal" and the
general case of algorithmic trading is "using a computer to automate a trading strategy."). For
discussion on technological innovation in securities markets and disruption of traditional
intermediation, see Chris Brummer, Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming Winter 2015).
4. See discussion infra Section II.C.
5. See discussion infra Section II.A.
6. See discussion infra Sections II.A-C.
7. See discussion infra Sections II.A-C.
8. See discussion infra Secions IIA-C. As discussed in more detail in Part II, scholars have
engaged in heated debates regarding market efficiency and whether markets are, in fact, efficient.
The case for market efficiency has faced strong criticism, for example from behavioral economists.
9. See discussion infra Sections IIA-C.
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productively. Put simply, informational efficiency in the market should
help bring about allocative efficiency for the economy.' 0
This Article challenges this conventional wisdom. It argues that
algorithmic trading creates trade-offs in the relationship between
informational and allocative efficiency. Though algorithms help
markets make gains on several measures of informational efficiency,
they also create costs for their ability to allocate capital productively.
With the considerable reliance that law and regulatory policy place on
prices in matters of allocative importance, this decoupling is significant
for bedrock assumptions underlying corporate and securities
regulation.
At first glance, the shift to automation holds much promise for
efficient markets-and, by extension, for capital allocation. Using
algorithms, traders can harness data, deploy complex analyses, and
submit orders at will to strategically execute their desired strategy.11
Rather than searching extensively for the ideal trade, or waiting for the
best time to send out orders, traders can rely on algorithms to do this
hard work for them.1 2 Transaction costs can diminish and so too the
cost-benefit threshold at which traders might enter markets with their
private reserves of information and insight.1 3 Looked at from this
perspective, securities prices should be more efficient than ever before,
reflecting available information almost instantaneously and
underpinned by deep data and computation. Not surprisingly, some
finance scholars have pointed to the superior informational efficiencies
of algorithmic markets, bringing into relief their power to convey
information through rapidly responsive prices.14
10. See discussion infra Sections II.A-C. As discussed in Part II, scholars note that
fundamental efficiency represents a largely unattainable standard. Efficient markets-at best-
offer informational efficiency. However, this informational efficiency may approximate
fundamental efficiency.
11. Scott Patterson, High-Speed Stock Traders Turn to Laser Beams, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11,
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303947904579340711424615716
[http://perma.cclF8GA-RNQ8] (noting the competition to reduce the speed at which stocks turnover
and the potential for trading speeds to come close to zero through the use of lasers).
12. See discussion infra Section H.C.
13. For example, if traders do not have to pay high fees in transaction costs to enter markets
with their private information, they may do so more often and where they stand to make only
modest gains. With higher transaction costs, traders might wait only until such time as they are
likely to make more money than it costs to trade.
14. See, e.g., Jonathan Brogaard et al., High Frequency Trading and Extreme Price
Movements (Nov. 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.comlabstract=2531122
[http://perma.ccl3XXP-3ESD] (examining transactions on the NASDAQ exchange and arguing
that HFT can prevent extreme price swings). For detailed discussion, see, infra Sections II.C &
III.A.
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In seeking out allocative efficiencies, however, the case for
automation becomes significantly more problematic. There are two
grounds for skepticism. First, pre-programmed algorithms create
information loss through a necessary dependence on pre-set
programming and models. 15 Algorithmic markets are characterized by
a systemic degree of "model risk" caused by widespread reliance on
stylized models and programming to capture messy real world
behavior.16 By necessity, algorithms must be programmed in advance
of trading.' 7 This means that traders must precisely stipulate their
trading strategies, assumptions, methodologies, and risk preferences ex
ante, requiring programmers to predict the scenarios their algorithms
will encounter over the course of trading. Especially for high-speed or
data-intensive algorithms, programming must account for the absence
of human intervention in real time. When trades move in milliseconds
and crunch gigabytes of data, algorithms must be able to trade largely
independently of their human programmers.18
Despite the sophistication of algorithms, capturing unknown
risks and uncertainties presents a daunting challenge to traders.19 The
longer the time horizon over which the model is designed to work and
the period of time over which securities are to be held, the tougher the
15. For analysis, see Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Law and the Art of Modeling: Are Models
Facts?, 103 GEO L. J. 825, 846-73 (2015) (analyzing whether models can be regarded as "facts" in
litigation and arguing that models should not be treated as facts given the choices involved in
creating models); Mehrsa Badaran, Regulating by Hypothetical, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1247, 1282-319
(2014) (analyzing the use of models and their effectiveness in banking regulation).
16. See discussion infra Section III.B.
17. For definitions of algorithmic trading, see IOSCO TECHNICAL COMM., Regulatory Issues
Raised by the Impact of Technological Changes on Market Integrity and Efficiency: Consultation
Report 10 (July 2011):
In its simplest guise, algorithmic trading may just involve the use of a basic algorithm .
. . to feed portions of an order into the market at pre-set intervals to minimise market
impact cost. At its most complex, it may entail many algorithms that are able to
assimilate information from multiple markets . . . in fractions of a second.
18. Michael Kearns & Yuriy Nevmyvaka, Machine Learning for Market Microstructure and
High Frequency Trading, in HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING 122-23 (David Easley, Marcos Lopez de
Prado & Maureen O'Hara eds., 2013) (examining machine learning in high-frequency trading and
creating algorithms able to model their likely impact on markets).
19. Dennis Bams, Thorsten Lehnert & Christian C.P. Wolff, An Evaluation Framework for
Alternative VaR (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Working Paper No. DP3403, 2003),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=424360 [http://perma.cc/6UAN-KES4] (showing the challenges of
modeling credit risk); Anil Bangia et al., Modeling Liquidity Risk with Implications for Traditional
Market Risk Measurement and Management (The Wharton Sch. U. Penn., Working Paper No. 99-
06, 1998), http://fic.wharton.upenn.edufic/papers/99/9906.pdf [http://perma.cc/ UV6P-6ZUS]
(arguing that traditional studies of market risk examine a "pure" form of risk that fails to
accurately account for certain frictions); see also Daniel Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L. J. 901,
905-10 (2010) (noting the challenge of modeling more quantifiable risks versus largely
unquantifiable uncertainties).
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task of making models robust enough to reflect the market's various
complexities. 20 And in very short-term markets, characterized by
securities changing hands in microseconds, errors and bad assumptions
are impossible to correct in real time. The necessity of predictive
modeling, combined with the logistical challenge of real-time
intervention, suggests that algorithmic markets face a kind of
Goldilocks dilemma. For models to work optimally, market conditions
should be exactly attuned to their assumptions and projections. Clearly,
this presents a tall order, even at the best of times.
Model risks raise concerns for capital allocation and the ability
of prices to function as windows into allocative efficiency. For one, the
costs and challenges of modeling create incentives for traders to develop
algorithms focused on the short-term rather than longer-term
performance of securities. Short time horizons are generally easier to
model, making algorithms more accurate and more likely to implement
pre-set trading strategies successfully. But here, private gains can come
at the expense of a more fundamental picture of corporate health. If
traders see more favorable private gains when trading in short-term
markets, they are less likely to invest in capturing longer-term market
dynamics in the algorithms they build. Where algorithmic traders focus
more on short-term trading, the efficiency gains promised by algorithms
are skewed in favor of near-term, rather than long-term investments.
Pre-set programming constraints also mean that algorithms
cannot reflect information that falls outside of the scope of their
programming. This might sound obvious, but it is significant for the
quality of prices that markets produce. Precisely because of their
constraints, algorithms can struggle to deal with exceptional situations
that fall outside of their programming-unexpected news, crashes, or
anomalous trading behavior that do not fit precisely set, ex ante
parameters. Given the high costs of building algorithms, traders have
little incentive to precision-program their algorithms to deal with
exceptional events that occur infrequently. Instead, it makes more
sense for traders to simply withdraw from the market in cases of market
20. For example, the finance literature has shown that momentum based strategies are
generally profitable. Momentum based strategies posit that stocks that have done well (badly) in
the last three-to-twelve-month period tend to continue to perform well (badly) in the next three to
twelve months. There is a large literature on this phenomenon. See Werner F.M. deBondt &
Richard H. Thaler, Does the Stock Market Overreact? 40 J. FIN. 793 (1985), for an example showing
that markets can overreact or underreact to information seemingly in tension with the efficient
markets hypothesis. Also see Louis K.C. Chan, Narasimhan Jegadeesh, & Josef Lakonishok,
Momentum Strategies, 51 J. FIN. 1681 (1996); Jennifer Conrad & Gautam Kaul, An Anatomy of
Trading Strategies, 11 REV. FIN. STUD. 489 (1998); and Daniel Kent, David Hirshleifer &
Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Investor Psychology and Security Market Under-and Overreactions,
53 J. FIN. 1839 (1998), for additional discussion on momentum-based strategies.
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disruption, leaving other traders to pick up the slack. While helpful for
individual traders, these dynamics are disruptive for the market as a
whole. If algorithmic traders can exit cheaply and do not have to
provision for unexpected risks, algorithms may fail to properly price
these risks into the programming that drives everyday trades.
Emerging empirical studies from finance scholars lend support
to this line of argument. Scholars have found, for example, that high-
frequency algorithmic traders tend to trade "directionally" over short
time horizons and are highly efficient in reflecting near-term price
changes. In other words, they are especially adept at trading in the
direction in which markets move in the very short term. Specifically,
aggressive high frequency traders have been found to transact in the
direction of permanent price changes and appear to best predict price
changes over horizons of around three to four seconds. 21 In times of
crisis, however, high-speed traders have been found to be unreliable.22
A study prepared by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Commodities and Futures Trading Commission, for example, noted
that a large number of high frequency traders exacerbated market
volatilities by rapidly leaving the market when conditions became
stressed unexpectedly. While individual traders saved themselves, the
market as a whole saw a catastrophic drop in activity.23
21. See Jonathan Brogaard, Terence Hendershott & Ryan Riordan, High Frequency Trading
and Price Discovery (Eur. Cent. Bank Working Paper Series No. 1602, 2013),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1928510 [http://perma.cc/E26T-3KHA] (arguing that HFT increases price
discovery by encouraging trades in the direction of price changes); see also Alain Chaboud,
Benjamin Chiquoine, Erik Hjalmarsson & Clara Vega, Rise of the Machines: Algorithmic Trading
in the Foreign Exchange Market (July 5, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
http://houseoffinance.se/admin/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/HjalmarssonSSRN-idl5Ol135.pdf
[http://perma.ce/KT4F-85RF] (noting higher efficiencies through HFT in the foreign exchange
market); Austin Gerig, High-Frequency Trading Synchronizes Prices in Financial Markets (Nov.
2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (showing that HFT trading encourages prices
in related securities to change contemporaneously. The suggestion here is that HFT is making the
securities more efficient. However, the author suggests that market stress may lead to stress
spreading quickly and links established between securities that are not necessarily linked by
fundamentals).
22. But see Brogaard et al., supra note 14.
23. See STAFFS OF THE CFTC AND SEC, FINDINGS REGARDING THE EVENTS OF MAY 6,2010 45
(2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf (studying the so-called
Flash Crash in May 2010 when the Dow Jones lost almost a thousand points in minutes before
rebounding quickly afterwards). This is discussed further in Section II.C of this Article. See,
however, events contributing to the Flash Crash in the market for U.S. Treasuries in October 15,
2014. In their official inquest, U.S. regulators observed that high frequency traders active in the
U.S. Treasury market remained active during the abnormal event and also provided liqudity.
However, the Report observed a sharp reduction in market depth-i.e. the number of quotes in the
order book. The Report suggested that HFT traders accounted for the largest share of the reduction
in the order book. The Report also noted that HFT firms accounted for the largest share in liquidity
removing trades. STAFFS OF THE UNITED STATES TREASURY ET AL., Joint Staff Report: The U.S.
Treasury Market on October 15, 2014, 4-6 (Jul. 13, 2015).
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Secondly, model risks and the informational deficits they
generate are nearly impossible to correct, a limitation that seriously
distorts capital allocation. Scholars have long looked to fundamentally
informed traders to supply intelligence and analysis to markets and to
fill gaps in information when they arise. With their focus on extracting
value-relevant insight from information, fundamental traders like
institutional investors drive the process by which markets become
efficient. In their now classic exposition, Professors Gilson and
Kraakman place informed traders at the heart of vibrant markets: by
seeking private gains through their intelligence and data, fundamental
traders also nourish markets with researched and reasoned trading.24
Algorithmic trading can impose costs on informed traders who
confront pervasive conflicts with algorithmic actors that can
systematically outrun them. 25 Notably, high-speed algorithmic traders
have powerful advantages over more fundamental traders. Specifically,
fast traders can decode how an informed trader is likely to transact and
get to the trade before anyone else. 2 6 By free-riding on the intelligence
of others, algorithmic traders save themselves time and money while
also taking home a share of the winnings. Faced with diminishing
gains, informed traders can end up with fewer incentives to invest in
long-term research and analysis. When informed actors see their gains
systematically reduced or wiped out by swifter algorithmic traders,
investing in good-quality information makes little business sense. With
24. See Ronald Gilson & Reinier R. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA.
L. REV. 549, 565-92 (1984) [hereinafter Mechanisms] (expounding on the main determinants of
market efficiency); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Market Efficiency after the Financial
Crisis: It's Still a Matter of Information Costs (Columbia Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 470,
2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2396608 [http://perma.cc/95HQ-NM25] [hereinafter Information
Costs]; Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier R. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency: Twenty
Years On (Nov. 29, 2003) (discussion paper), http://1sr.nellco.org/cgil
viewcontent.cgi?article=1234&context=harvardolin [http://perma.cc/H6QQ-N2S5]; see also
Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857,
894-95 (1983) (proposing a revision of insider trading laws to allow managers to reveal inside
information through trading); John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a
Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 722-24 (1984) (underlining the importance of
information and mandatory disclosure in securities markets); Zohar Goshen & Gideon
Parchmovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets and "Negative"Property Rights in Information, 87 VA.
L. REV. 1229, 1233 (2001) (arguing, unlike Carlton and Fischel, that trading rights in insider
information be allocated to information traders as a means of improving informational
efficiencies). For an international perspective, see Chris J. Brummer, Post-American Securities
Regulation, 98 CAL. L. REV. 327, 378-82 (2010) (analyzing how U.S. securities laws import their
policy preferences internationally through regulatory clubs).
25. See discussion infra Section III.C. In popular literature, see, MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH
BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT (2014). For discussion, see, e.g., Matt Egan, Flash Boys in the Hot
Seat at Hearing, CNN MONEY (June 17, 2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/06/17/investing/high-
frequency-trading-hearing/ [http://perma.cc/3L5U-35UK].
26. See discussion infra Section III.C.
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markets continuing to grow more short-term in focus, long-term trading
promises a poor trade-off. Actors of all stripes might look to invest their
limited capital in less research-intensive markets. Investment in
acquiring a long-term picture of the market can suffer as a result.
These insights raise serious questions for regulatory policy,
which relies pervasively on prices as a proxy for value-relevant
information about Main Street companies and their governance. Prices
offer a mechanism to supervise public companies and to discipline them
if prices reflect information that company performance is below par.
Price-related information routinely acts as a trigger for a wide spectrum
of governance mechanisms. For example, securities prices provide a
benchmark to tie pay to the performance of managers running a
company. If managers do well, their successes and failures should be
reflected in the prices at which company securities trade; therefore,
using prices as a signal to regulate managerial pay and performance
makes considerable sense.27 Similarly, to maximize value at
underperforming companies, the market for corporate control looks to
share prices as a hook for takeover battles. Prices can signal that
managers have not extracted full value from target companies, setting
the stage for tender offers and proxy fights as well as the regulatory
scrutiny that invariably accompanies them.28
With these promised benefits for capital allocation, regulators
invest heavily in bringing price efficiency to markets. 29 Public
companies are subject to a mandatory disclosure regime that
disseminates corporate information to investors, reducing their costs of
procuring information. 30 Regulation also forces exchanges to compete
with one another with the aim of reducing the transaction costs
involved in trading. 31
Implicit in these examples lies the enduring notion of prices as
a window into long-term allocative value in capital markets generated
by a market that processes information quickly and efficiently. As this
Article demonstrates, this relationship between informational and
fundamental allocative efficiency can no longer be taken for granted in
27. See discussion infra Section I.C.
28. See discussion infra Part II.C. The literature on this issue is vast. For a discussion of
established rules governing acquisition-related disclosures and reform proposals, see, for example,
Lucian Bebchuk et al., Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy, 39
J. CORP. L. 1 (2013); see also Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/
rules/petitions/2011/petn4-624.pdf [http://perma.cclZ2WU-37L8].
29. See discussion infra Section II.C.
30. See discussion infra Section III.C.
31. See discussion infra Section III.C.
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algorithmic markets. As a result, it is debatable whether today's
securities prices offer a thorough, substantive interpretation of
corporate value. If not, the law's wholesale reliance on prices for
valuation becomes increasingly misplaced.
Part II of this Article examines the growth of algorithmic trading
in securities markets. It observes that algorithms represent pre-
programmed instructions for trading. Being pre-set, algorithms rely on
models and programming that must be calibrated ex ante to deal with
complex markets in real time, creating a high burden for traders to get
it right.
Part III engages with longstanding debates on the efficiency of
markets and their capacity to reflect available information in the prices
at which securities trade. An analysis of law and finance scholarship
shows that prices have traditionally been regarded as a guide for capital
allocation in the economy. With prices as a foundation of governance
mechanisms for executive compensation regimes, the market for
corporate control, and shareholder monitoring, regulatory policy firmly
links informational with allocative efficiency in capital markets.
Part IV critiques the rationales interlinking informational and
allocative efficiency. It highlights the significance of model risk in
securities markets and draws into relief the costs facing fundamental
traders in algorithmic markets, which drive them to invest less in
mitigating information deficits. Information losses caused by pre-set
models can be significant for capital allocation when they prevent prices
from functioning as effective governance mechanisms for capital.
Finally, Part V surveys pathways for progressing reform of
regulatory policy in securities markets and corporate governance. As
innovative markets decouple informational and allocative efficiency,
regulators must come up with an alternative as intuitive as prices to
offer insight into the fundamental workings of capital markets.
II. THE CENTRAL ROLE OF ALGORITHMS IN MARKETS
Markets and their users have long wrestled with basic logistical
limitations to the flow of trading. Traders must reckon with the time
and expense of obtaining information, analyzing it, making a decision
about whether to trade, and racing to the prime opportunity to do so
ahead of any competitor. These transaction costs have traditionally
curtailed the volume of information likely to be collected by a trader,
the sophistication of her analysis, and the speed at which she might be
expected to transact. Algorithms have radically reshaped the terms of
the bargain in this age-old dynamic.
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The growth of algorithmic trading over the years can be
explained by the significant utilities it offers for almost all parts of the
trading process.3 2 From deciding what to trade and submitting an order
to executing and finalizing a transaction, algorithms have enabled
markets to far exceed the cognitive bounds of humans in processing
information. Rather than rely on human brains to perform the hard
tasks of trading in real time, these may be delegated instead to
algorithms. With proper programming set in advance, algorithms can
harness complex financial models, computations, statistical analysis,
and artificial intelligence to transact at speeds measured increasingly
in microseconds.
This Part sets the foundation for the central argument in this
Article. It shows that algorithmic trading is a largely inevitable and, in
many ways, efficiency-enhancing force in modern markets.33 But the
very design of algorithmic trading, notably its reliance on pre-
programmed processes to make real-time trading decisions, can also
create steep long-term informational deficits to the detriment of capital
allocation.
A. Algorithms and Trading
Despite its significance, algorithmic trading has only recently
entered the public consciousness. 34 For the most part, the public's
imagination has been captured by the phenomenon of high frequency
trading (HFT), a subset of algorithmic trading characterized by
transactions executed at high volume and in the space of milliseconds
or microseconds. 35 News of near catastrophes popularly attributed to
HFT, such as the infamous May 2010 Flash Crash, when the Dow Jones
dropped almost 1000 points in minutes before rebounding, has drawn
attention and suspicion regarding the workings of hyper-fast
32. See Andrei A. Kirilenko & Andrew M. Lo, Moore's Law us. Murphy's Law: Algorithmic
Trading and its Discontents, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 51, 51-52 (2013) (showing the heightened trading
volume in the last decade-whereas a doubling of trading volume appears to occur every 2.9 years,
rather than 7.5 years, since 1929).
33. Id. at 52 (noting that it is "inexorable" that financial markets will look to make their
world faster and cheaper).
34. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 25.
35. See, e.g., STAFFS OF THE CFTC AND SEC, supra note 23, at 45 ("HFTs are proprietary
trading firms that use high speed systems to monitor market data and submit large numbers of
orders to the markets. HFTs utilize quantitative and algorithmic methodologies to maximize the
speed of their market access and trading strategies."); see also David Easley, Marcos M. L6pez de
Prado & Maureen O'Hara, The Volume Clock: Insights into the High-Frequency Paradigm, 39 J.
PORTFOLIO MGMT. 19 (2012) (suggesting that HFT should be characterized by volume rather than
speed of execution).
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algorithms.36 However, this singular focus on HFT fails to capture the
rich and varied history of algorithmic trading that has, from the 1970s
onwards, come to play an increasingly dominant role in the securities
market.37 Today, algorithmic trading accounts for around, 70% of all
equity trading volume in the United States.38 Invariably, it has
generated significant changes in how information is collected, who uses
it, and the deliberative dynamic of these actors.
Algorithmic trading is variously defined in the literature.
Broadly, it reflects the use of precise, pre-programmed computerized
instructions in all aspects of executing a trade.39 This definition holds
more significance than first meets the eye.
36. See, e.g., Graham Bowley, The Flash-Crash, in Miniature, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/business/09flash.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/DQ3C-X6RS]
(noting that the market suffers a regular stream of mini flash crashes in individual stocks);
Graham Bowley, Lone $4.1 Billion Sale Led to 'Flash Crash' in May, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/02/business/02flash.html [http://perma.cc/Z66R-5RFK]; Edward
E. Kaufman Jr. & Carl M. Levin, Opinion, Preventing the Next Flash Crash, N.Y. TIMES (May 5,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/06/opinion/06kaufman.html [http://perma.cc/DUW8-
X4XP] (discussing the implications of the so-called "Flash Crash" in May 2010 when nearly $1
trillion in value from the stock market was wiped out, before rebounding equally quickly. This
marked the biggest one-day price decline in the history of the Dow Jones.); see also SAL L. ARNUK
& JOSEPH SALUZZI, WHY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS SHOULD BE CONCERNED ABOUT HIGH
FREQUENCY TRADERS, http://blog.themistrading.com/2009/07/why-institutional-investors-should-
be-concerned-about-high-frequency-traders/ [http://perma.cc/9T2E-WLKR] (listing various
concerns with HFTs); Michael Mackenzie et al., SEC to Review 'Flash' Orders, FIN. TIMES, (July
28, 2009), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/039fe8f6-7all-11de-b86f-00144feabdcO.html
#axzz3kPGSbBkJ [http://perma.cc/Y3LN-BVFD] (noting some of the abuses by practices that
"flash" orders disseminate information to certain traders before others).
37. Michael J. McGowan, The Rise of Computerized High Frequency Trading: Use and
Controversy, 9 DUKE L. TECH. REV., 2010, at 1, 4-7 (tracing the history of algorithmic trading in
the market, noting the move to using electronic order submission technologies from the ticker tape
to the NYSE's Designed Order Turnaround (DOT) and later SUPERDOT order entry systems in
the 1970s and 1980s). For an analysis of the rise of high-frequency trading in the context of
technological innovation, see, Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 688 (2013).
38. Michael Mackenzie, High Frequency Trading under Scrutiny, FIN. TIMES, (July 28, 2009),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d5fa0660-7b95-1lde-9772-00144feabdcO.html #axzz3kPGSbBkJ
[http://perma.cc/RV5A-LMHT] (showing that 73% of volume is attributable to high frequency
trading. Such trading demands algorithms. It is likely that the volume due to algorithmic trading
in general is higher than the figure of 73%); see also Jeffrey MacIntosh, High Frequency Traders:
Angels or Devils?, C.D. Howe Institute Commentary No. 391, at 3-
5, http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/Commentary_391.pdf [http://perma.cc/RZ3P-Y59J].
39. E.g., STAFF OF THE CFTC, GLOSSARY: ALGORITHMIC TRADING, http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/
groups/public/@educationcenter/documents/file/cftcglossary.pdf [http://perma.ce/38CL-6768] ("The
use of computer programs for entering trading orders with the computer algorithm initiating
orders or placing bids and offers."); Public Consultation: Review of Market in Financial Instruments
Directive (MiFID), EUROPEAN COMMISSION at 14 (Dec. 8 2010), http://ec.europa.eu/
internaLmarket/consultations/docs/2010/mifid/consultationpaperen.pdf [http://perma.cc/X25Y-
YH6C] ("[A]1gorithmic trading can be defined as the use of computer programmes to enter trading
orders where the computer algorithm decides on aspects of execution of the order such as the
timing, quantity and price of the order.").
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First, automated trading requires investment in constructing a
detailed plan before any trading can take place. Traders devise a
strategy to buy and sell securities. Programmers then build the
computerized algorithm or series of algorithms to execute the strategy
in the market. 40 This makes algorithmic trading anticipatory in nature.
Rather than deploying human traders to crunch numbers, observe
markets, and determine the best trades in real time, algorithmic
trading firms rely instead on pre-set algorithms. 41 Of course, humans
remain deeply involved. They develop the strategy, program the
algorithm, and monitor its operations. Traders take a view in advance
as to how the market might behave, their likely risk appetites, and the
pay-offs they wish to achieve before using the algorithm.
Second, precisely because algorithms are tasked to perform
complex trades using deep data and speed, they must possess some
programmed "decision-making" capacity. In other words, algorithms
must be capable of evaluating the importance of data, attaching a value
to its content, and then making a deal independently of human traders
by submitting orders to the market. Rather than waiting for human
beings to read the news, regulatory disclosures, or changing prices,
algorithms can perform this data collection and analysis. 42 Indeed,
recognizing the enormous importance of algorithms as a form of
"decision-maker" in the market, artificial intelligence has come to hold
considerable appeal.43 For example, algorithms are often built to
anticipate how their own trading impacts the trading of other players
and to adapt their trading to reflect consequential price changes. 44
Third, traders set parameters within which their algorithms
trade. At their core, algorithms comprise pre-set mathematical
instructions that detail their exact terms of operation. These
40. For insightful discussion, see RISHI K. NARANG, INSIDE THE BLACK Box: A SIMPLE GUIDE
TO QUANTITATIVE AND HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING, 8-9, 24-62 (2d ed. 2013).
41. See, e.g., Aaron Lucchetti & Brett Philbin, Now, It is Man vs. Machine, WALL ST. J., (Aug.
9, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443991704577577190049118980
[http://perma.cc/C5RX-GCVL] (discussing a move by Morgan Stanley to reduce its bond trading
desk and replace human traders with algorithmic traders).
42. NARANG, supra note 40, at 42-43.
43. Scorr PATTERSON, DARK POOLS: THE RISE OF THE MACHINE TRADERS AND THE RIGGING
OF THE STOCK MARKET, 322-35 (2013) (discussing "Star," a machine learning artificially intelligent
trading system of a firm known as Rebellion Research, which uses artificial intelligence to trade
and has seen success from its strategies); Tommy Wilkes & Laurence Fletcher, The Algorithms
Arms Race, REUTERS (May 21, 2012), http://graphics.thomsonreuters .comi/12/05/BlackBox.pdf
[http://perma.c[L529-TZJ3]. For an insightful discussion about artificial learning in everyday
applications like Netflix and the rights to free speech protection, see, Tim Wu, Machine Speech,
161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495 (2013).
44. See, e.g., Michael Kearns & Yuriy Nevmyvaka, supra note 18 (analyzing the application
of machine learning techniques for algorithmic trading).
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parameters serve both to enable trading and to constrain the activities
of the algorithm in the market. In the absence of real-time human
supervision, setting limiting parameters ex ante assumes paramount
importance. 45 These instructions stipulate the data that an algorithm
collects, the rules for sorting out data into usable information, as well
as the financial models and risk-calculations for deciding what to trade,
when, and for how much.46 Some algorithms may utilize historical
troves of data to gauge past patterns of wins and losses, or survey
current markets to figure out immediate trends for momentum-driven
trading.47 Instructions also set limits on when an algorithm should stop
trading. Sharp or sudden falls in market prices, unexpected events, or
low payoffs may trigger a rapid exit from the market. 48
To achieve these objectives, algorithms depend on financial
models for their operation. Models are used to abstractly represent
market conditions and forecast and calibrate relationships between
economic variables.49 They offer tremendous benefit to traders. Models
bring organizing assumptions to analysis of financial information and
relationships. With swaths of data, models provide a tool to track
correlations within the morass of observable data points and to plot a
strategy that can make money from a combination of their interactions.
They can take diffuse qualitative information and, through their
processing, deliver a clearly quantitative output.50 Commentators
recognize that models are not perfect copies of the world. While models
can evince great sophistication, they cannot capture every nuance and
detail in actual trading.5 1 Put bluntly, they simplify the untidy state of
the world. 52 Still, by using models, traders can estimate the state of
markets and the behavior of their algorithm. This estimation helps
45. NARANG, supra note 40, at 28-44.
46. IRENE ALDRIDGE, HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ALGORITHMIC
STRATEGIES AND TRADING SYSTEMS (2010), 21-31.
47. See, e.g., Christian Dunis et al., Optimising Intraday Trading Models with Genetic
Algorithms, 1-5 (2011), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=
E7F1782A50C6BABA69A68E10943661DD?doi=10.1.1.196.9372&rep=repl&type=pdf (describing
a "genetic" algorithm and some of the parameters describing its operation).
48. For an detailed account, see ALDRIDGE, supra note 46, at 13-19,49-60; and Peter Gomber
et al., High Frequency Trading 21-25, (June 6, 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1858626 [http://perma.cc/D4AL-QB5A], which provides useful surveys of
key types of trading algorithms including those driven by volume and time-based trading.
49. ALDRIDGE, supra note 46, at 13-19; Emanuel Derman, Metaphors, Models and Theories
10-11 (Nov. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1713405 [http://perma.cc/
XWB4-ES9H].
50. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., SR LETTER 11-7, SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE
ON MODEL RISK MANAGEMENT, 1-3 (Apr. 4, 2011).
51. Id.
52. Derman, supra note 49, at 1, 10-11.
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traders to map out costs and benefits ex ante. By investing intellectual
and economic capital in building good-quality, robustly-tested models,
traders can reduce their monitoring and liability costs and bolster their
trading performance as a result.
Pre-set algorithmic programming and modeling seek to
abstractly represent the state of the market and a desired trajectory for
trading.53 They try to make sense of the swath of data generated by the
market to generate a usable output. For example, an algorithm's model
might analyze a listed company's past dividends, available data on its
debt, and market conditions, and take a position on the current value
of the shares. 54 Once the algorithm has calculated the value of shares,
it can decide whether to buy or sell shares based on a pre-set strategy.
The algorithm might use established valuation modeling techniques
from finance theory, crunching large amounts of data to arrive at a more
exact valuation for the security using the model.55 As Rishi Narang, an
established practitioner, notes, algorithms can powerfully utilize
models common to finance theory by harnessing large amounts of data
and deploying combinations of models at the same time, far exceeding
the computational capacity of human traders.56
B. High-Frequency Trading
Despite its prevalence, regulators have failed to agree on a
definition for high frequency trading (HFT).57 In many ways, HFT is
impossible to define. As the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) observes, HFT can be identified by a few key characteristics but
53. Id.
54. Toshiyasu Kato & Toshinao Yoshiba, Model Risk and its Control, 18 MONETARY AND
ECON. STUD. 129, 129-32, 146-50 (2000) (noting the various components of a financial model).
55. FRANKLIN ALLEN ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE (10th ed. 2011), 74-93, 156-
212 (describing models for valuing stock and risk in corporate finance theory).
56. NARANG, supra note 40, at 13-19, 23-62.
57. Notably, studies have estimated that HFT drives around 70% of trading volume in
equities. It is also regarded as responsible for around 60% of trading volume in the U.S. futures
market. HFT is emerging across securities types to include U.S. Treasuries, bonds, and certain
swaps. See Mackenzie, supra note 38, at 22 (noting the increasing presence of high frequency
traders in the market); Philip Stafford, Arash Massoudi & Michael Mackenzie, NASDAQ Sets the
Stage for HFT in Treasuries, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6e0ac4de-
9d08-11e2-a8db-00144feabdcO.html#axzz3q5mJhxan [http://perma.cc/G4F8-VFTZ] (explaining
that Nasdaq's purchase of eSpeed electronic training platform may increase presence of high
frequency traders in the bond market). See generally Alexander Osipovich, Algorithmic Trading
in Energy Markets, RISK MAGAZINE, Jan. 2012 (noting the rise of algorithmic trading in energy
markets).
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is not reducible to them.6 8 Securities changing hands in milliseconds
and the use of algorithms comprise two notable, necessary
characteristics of HFT. In addition, HFT traders tend to locate their
servers close to exchanges, use small amounts of daily capital, and
transmit large volumes of orders which are cancelled in more than 90%
of cases.59
But these behaviors are not limited to HFT traders. Many slower
traders are often just relatively less speedy (by a matter of milliseconds,
if not less). Non-HFTs too rely on algorithms, make and cancel orders,
house their servers near exchanges etc., making HFTs and non-HFTs
difficult to tell apart in practice. 60
HFT is costly for its traders to implement. Unable to intervene
in real time, good programming is essential to achieve profits and to
avoid expensive mistakes.61 Algorithms, and the technology needed to
operationalize them, must be powerful and sufficiently precise to parse
large volumes of data and to extract significance for immediate
trading.62 Moreover, with miniscule holding periods, traders stand to
make little gain per individual transaction even if strategies succeed. 63
58. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE LITERATURE REVIEW: HIGH
FREQUENCY TRADING 4 (2014), https://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/researchlhft-lit-review
march_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/N8HH-TGEA].
59. Id.; see also Irene Aldridge, Market Microstructure and the Risks of High-Frequency
Trading 2-4 (Aug. 19, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2294526
[http://perma.cc/65JG-7PEA] (noting that around 95% of limit orders on NASDAQ are cancelled
within one minute of being placed).
60. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE LITERATURE REVIEW: HIGH
FREQUENCY TRADING 4 (2014); see also Nicholas Hirschey, Do High Frequency Traders Anticipate
Buying and Selling Pressure? 1-4 (Apr. 1, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2238516 [http://perma.cc/XLE2-TNVU]; Frank Zhang, High-Frequency
Trading, Stock Volatility, and Price Discovery 2-3 (Dec. 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1691679 [http://perma.cc/RW7Q-FMW8] ("HFT refers to fully automated
trading strategies with very high trading volume and extremely short holding periods ranging
from milliseconds to minutes and possibly hours."). For a discussion of SEC systems and HFT
traders, see, Robert Jackson & Joshua Mitts, How the SEC Helps Speedy Traders 3-6 (The Ctr.
for Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 501, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2520105
[http://perma.cc/MT3L-XXDM which shows favorable dissemination of SEC filings to HFT
traders.
61. Nick Baumann, Too Fast to Fail: Is High-Speed Trading the Next Wall Street Disaster?,
MOTHER JONES, (Feb. 2013), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/02/high-frequency-
trading-danger-risk-wall-street [http://perma.ccIP9YC-7FJG] (detailing some of the key events
leading up to the collapse of Knight Capital, which was once a major HFT trader, but lost $450
million in forty-five minutes owing to a faulty algorithm); Nathaniel Popper, High Speed Trade
Giants to Merge, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2012, at Bl; Alexandra Stevenson, Knight Capital Fined,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2013, at B9 (detailing the problems that affected Knight Capital and failures
to implement proper controls, resulting in an SEC fine).
62. See, e.g., NARANG, supra note 40, at 15-16 (arguing that HFT algorithms must engage
in significant, complex data mining to react immediately to near-term data).
63. ALDRIDGE, supra note 46, at 1-3.
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Still, despite the tall odds, HFT has shown itself to be lucrative and
capable of attracting significant intellectual and logistical investment. 64
For one, HFT traders face fewer risks than slower competitors.
The ability to enter and exit the market rapidly limits the risks that
traders may be left holding. Rather than locking capital in specific
investments for a meaningful period of time, over which any of these
might fail, HFT traders exit cheaply by virtue of their speed and
technology. Holding tiny amounts of risk at any given moment, HFT
traders do not need to invest deeply in understanding the longer-term
behavior of securities. Rather, they win by anticipating the immediate
likely direction of the market and trading rapidly to run faster than
others to get there. Unsurprisingly, finance scholars have observed that
HFT traders show considerable ability at anticipating market
directionality over the span of three or four seconds. 65 Moreover,
because traders do not hold securities for a lengthy period of time, they
also do not need to provide for risks by holding large amounts of capital.
Through the day, they can trade using small amounts of capital to buy
and sell batches of securities that turnover rapidly. As the risks they
hold are fleeting, HFT firms do not have to be thickly capitalized. The
advent of HFT and algorithmic trading has thus seen the arrival of non-
traditional, specialized trading firms. Firms like Tradeworx, which by
some estimates is responsible for trading around 1.5% of all daily
trading in U.S. stocks, exemplify this trend towards the smaller,
specialized trading firm.66
HFT firms make money by trading securities for tiny moments
in time and making a tiny profit on each trade. Their gains are small,
incremental, and steady. HFT firms make a sliver of profit on each
trade, accumulating gains because transactions are multiplied at high
speed and high volume throughout the day.67 The core of this business
model is described by the HFT firm, Virtu Financial. In documents filed
64. Id. at 1 (noting that, anecdotally at least, HFT practitioners delivered positive returns
in 2008 even though 70% of low-frequency firms lost money).
65. Jonathan Brogaard et al., High Frequency Trading and Price Discovery 10 (Apr. 22,
2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1928510 [http://perma.cc/RW7Q-
FMW8].
66. Scott Patterson, Man Vs. Machine: Seven Major Players in High-Frequency Trading,
CNBC (Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.cnbc.com/id/39038892 [http://perma.cclPH7D-XVWU];
Nathaniel Popper & Ben Protess, To Regulate Rapid Traders, SEC Turns to One of Them, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2012, at B1.
67. IOSCO TECHNICAL COMM., supra note 17, at 23-25. For an excellent discussion, see
Albert J. Menkveld, High Frequency Trading and the New Market-Makers, 16 J. FIN. MKTS. 712,
714 (2013), which notes the emergence of HFT traders as market-makers and their prominent
presence in major US exchanges. See also Chaboud et al., supra note 21, at 1-4, 11-12 (analyzing
foreign exchange markets).
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for a proposed Initial Public Offering in 2014, Virtu explained that it
generated revenue "by buying and selling large volumes of securities
and other financial instruments" and earning small amounts of money
based on the difference between what buyers are willing to pay and
what sellers are willing to accept."68 Indeed, Virtu noted that it had lost
money on only one day in four years of trading.69 When this strategy
works, traders leave the market holding almost no risk on their books. 70
Finally, it is worth noting that HFT algorithms must be
especially capable of reading and valuing news independently.
Particularly in this context, sophisticated programming and modeling
is essential. Designed to trade in micro and milliseconds, HFT
algorithms routinely receive data from newsfeeds, social media,
exchanges, and regulatory agencies. They must be able to determine
how to trade based on incoming data, mining its content for value-
relevant information and submitting orders to reflect this information.
To achieve this, HFT algorithms generally scan through incoming news
and react rapidly to certain evocative words like "unemployment,"
"recession," "IPO" etc. In one infamous example in April 2013, a tweet
reported that explosions had occurred at the White House and that
President Obama had been injured. Within three minutes, the Dow
Jones Industrial Average fell almost 150 points. 180,000 Treasury
futures changed hands. The S&P 500 lost $136 billion in value. The
panic subsided when the tweet was discovered to be the work of
malicious hackers. Algorithms, poised to trade on breaking news,
recognized terms like "explosion" and "White House" and reacted.7 '
C. Some Examples of Algorithmic Trading Strategies
Algorithmic trading offers opportunities to use trading
strategies using computation, data, and speed. Some common uses for
algorithms include: (i) making trades that take place at a pre-set price
68. Virtu Financial Inc., Registration Statement Filing (Form S-1) (Mar. 10, 2014), at 1.
69. Id. at 1-3; see also MacIntosh, supra note 38, at 2, 14-19 (noting also that algorithmic
trading has generated the rise of specialist algorithmic trading firms); U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N,
EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE LITERATURE REVIEW: HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING 4-6 (Mar. 2014).
70. ALDRIDGE, supra note 46, at 1-3 (describing characteristics of HFT).
71. See, e.g., Peter Foster, 'Bogus' AP Tweet about Explosion at the White House Wipes
Billions off US Markets, THE TELEGRAPH (Apr. 23, 2013),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/markets/10013768/Bogus-AP-tweet-about-explosion-at-the-
White-House-wipes-billions-off-US-markets.html [http://perma.cc/9N6M-M4FP] (explaining that
the FBI and SEC launched investigations into the hacked Twitter account); Alina Selyukh,
Hackers Send Fake Market-Moving AP Tweet on White House Explosions, REUTERS (Apr. 23, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/23/net-us-usa-whitehouse-ap-idUSBRE93M12Y20130423
[http://perma.cc/56QE-F5DS] (reporting that the fake tweet was likely sent out by the Syrian
Electronic Army following their hacking of the twitter account of the Associated Press).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
(trigger trades); (ii) performing arbitrage; (iii) market making; (iv)
anticipating orders of informed traders; and (v) breaking up orders.72
These strategies can be beneficial for market quality. Where algorithms
trade securities using complex computation, data, and analysis, and
reacting rapidly to new information, they can dramatically improve the
quality of information introduced and internalized by the market. HFT
traders, in particular, have also specialized as modern "market
makers," standing ready to buy and sell securities and to keep securities
market liquid.
Trigger trades: Computer programs send electronic orders to
trade securities in accordance with pre-set strategies.73 Computers can
observe price patterns in a stock and buy or sell the stock at a trigger
price decided by a human trader. For an investor looking to buy Public
Company shares at $10 dollars a share, an algorithm observes the
market and sends a purchase order as soon as the price reaches this
figure.
Such strategies can be applied in vastly more sophisticated
ways. With the growth of computing power and connectivity, machines
can monitor securities prices across marketplaces and trade volumes of
stocks at a pre-set price limit. Buyers can engage in "sweeps" of the
marketplace to purchase a large number of shares across multiple
venues at a set price.74 Algorithms send orders to venues that trade the
stock at the best price or that have the desired volume of securities
available,75 picking off small amounts of the security from different
markets. 76 Such sweeps might form part of a larger trading strategy. It
is possible to imagine, for example, that large sweeps might impact
72. This section relies heavily on Terrence Hendershott et al., Does Algorithmic Trading
Improve Liquidity?, 66 J. FIN. 1, 1-2 (2011), which describes the main types of algorithmic trading,
and MacIntosh, supra note 38, at 3-7, which discusses algorithmic trading techniques.
73. Algorithmic trading should not be confused with "program trading," which refers to
simultaneously trading bundles of fifteen or more stocks worth a combined $1 million or more. It
is generally useful for trading portfolios of securities. Program trades were partially blamed for
contributing to the October 1987 Crash. Program trading eventually spawned algorithmic trading,
which is not constrained by the number of stocks or the amount. For discussion, see Mara Der
Hovanesian, Cracking the Street's New Math, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 17, 2005),
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2005-04-17/cracking-the-streets-new-math
[http://perma.cc/7MNZ-N5PC].
74. See generally Easley et al., supra note 35, at 22-26 (providing examples of a price-
sampling process and a tactical liquidity provision algorithim).
75. Id.
76. Hendershott et al., supra note 72, at 5-13, 16-23 (noting the algorithms, strategies, and
their impact of market quality).
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market price. This then allows a trader to sell or "flip" the securities she
has just bought at a profit.77
Without algorithms, such types of expansive searches and swift
execution would be impossible. A buyer would have to instruct her
broker to search the market for the desired number of securities, the
broker would have to ensure that it could purchase a large number of
securities quickly without moving the market, and then would have to
look for onward buyers to generate profit from the strategy. Not only
would a broker's search and execution costs be high, but the investor
would likely have to hand over a sizable slice of the winnings as broker's
commission and in transaction costs arising from slow, uncertain
execution.78
Arbitrage: Just as algorithms can help to scour markets in
search of securities trading at a preferred price, they can also scan
markets for securities whose prices may vary between venues. This
might happen when shares of a Public Company may be trading at $100
on Exchange X and at $101 on Exchange Y. Assuming that the prices
should eventually converge, algorithms help traders seek out
opportunities to make money from the tiny price differences between
exchanges-or arbitrage. A trader can purchase Public Company shares
at $100 on Exchange X and sell it for $101 on Exchange Y, helping
prices to correct towards efficiency. With the ability to scan across
markets, crunch volumes of data, and deploy complex statistics and
probability analyses, algorithms can find not only existing
opportunities for arbitrage but also predict future price divergences.79
Indeed, algorithms have become especially useful at spotting and
trading away even minute price differences. Algorithms can quickly
scan hundreds of thousands of instruments for price variances, instead
of just a few such instrument-types as in past years.8
With these abilities, algorithms should make it easier for traders
to move the market towards greater price efficiencies. With machines
able to research multiple market venues at high speed and with
77. Id. at 2-4. See, e.g., Bloomberg Launches Smart Algorithm, AUTOMATED TRADER,
http://www.automatedtrader.net/headlines/7419/bloomberg-tradebook-launches-smart-algorithm
[http://perma.cc/SS97-DE9V] (describing Bloomberg's SOAR "sweep" algorithm).
78. Hendershott et al., supra note 72, at 2-5.
79. FORESIGHT, THE FUTURE OF COMPUTER TRADING IN FINANCIAL MARKETS: FINAL PROJECT
REPORT 28-30 (2012) (detailing the ability of powerful computing to engage in a variety of
arbitrage strategies).
80. Id. at 29-30.
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considerable precision, arbitrage becomes easier and cheaper to
implement.81
Market-making: HFT firms especially have thrived as market-
makers in securities markets. This means that they stand ready to buy
and sell securities using their own money in order to keep the market
liquid and orderly. A major difference between HFT firms and
traditional market-makers lies in the ability of HFT to make thousands
of such trades in milliseconds. Unsurprisingly, HFT firms have come to
dominate exchanges as market-makers. Their superior technology and
speed allow them to rapidly enter and exit trades, limiting the longer-
term risks and costs they face. By market-making, commentators
suggest, HFT firms also provide a genuine service to the market,
improving its ability to help investors. With an HFT algorithm standing
ready to trade with them, investors can enjoy low cost access to
markets, faster execution, and more competitive commissions. 82
The market has come to depend on HFT traders for this market-
making role. 83 This fact came to light in spectacular fashion during the
May 2010 Flash Crash. As is now well-known, the Dow Jones
experienced a historic single day fall on May 6, 2010-losing over 900
points in minutes before regaining almost a $1 trillion in lost value
equally quickly. 84 HFT traders were, in the SEC/CFTC's official inquest,
81. There is a growing literature in the area of high frequency trading and efficiency. See,
e.g., Jonathan Brogaard et al., High Frequency Trading and Price Discovery 19-23 (Apr. 22, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1928510 [http://perma.cclRW7Q-FMW8J
(arguing that HFT increases price discovery by encouraging trades in the direction of price
changes); Chaboud et al., supra note 21, at 21-22 (noting higher efficiencies through HFT in the
foreign exchange market). For discussion, see Gerig, supra note 21, at 1-5, which shows that HFT
trading encourages prices in related securities to change contemporaneously. The suggestion here
is that HFT is making the securities more efficient. However, the author suggests that market
stress may lead to stress spreading quickly and links established between securities that are not
necessarily linked by fundamentals.
82. Menkveld, supra note 67, at 714 (noting that spreads fell upon the entry of a HFT firm
on the exchange subject to the study). But see Terrence Hendershott & Pamela C. Moulton,
Automation, Speed, and Stock Market Quality: The NYSE's Hybrid 2-3 (Feb. 2, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1159773 [http://perma.cc/98P7-CDL3]
(arguing that in NYSE's Hybrid Market, immediate execution increased spreads).
83. E.g., David S. Hilzenrath, High Frequency Trading Raises Concerns at SEC, WASH. POST
(Feb. 22, 2012), http://washingtonpost.com/business/economy/high-frequency-trading-raises-
concerns-at-sec/2012/02/22/gIQAfpLdTRstory.html [http://perma.ccl8TE9-ASQH]; Mackenzie,
supra note 38. For a summary of current policy concerns and proposals, see FORESIGHT, supra note
79, at 13-17. This is particularly important after the May 2010 Flash Crash and smaller Flash
Crashes endemic to the market following the emergence of HFT.
84. David Easley et al., The Microstructure of the Flash Crash, 37 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 118,
118 (2011).
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not blamed for starting the crisis.85 However, their behavior during the
crash was deemed a contributing factor to its depth. HFT traders were
criticized for leaving the market in large numbers rather than for any
bad or disruptive trades actually performed.86 In other words, HFT
traders faced scrutiny for fleeing when they should have stayed to
ensure the market remained liquid.87
Order anticipation: Algorithms can help opportunistic traders
engage in "order anticipation" strategies. Broadly, "order anticipation"
strategies involve algorithmic traders working out whether a
fundamental investor has placed a large order and to use this
knowledge to trade ahead of the fundamental investor. For example, a
Mutual Fund intends to purchase 10,000 shares of Public Company at
$100 per share. An algorithmic trader can benefit when it realizes that
the Mutual Fund is looking to place a large order for Public Company
shares. The Algorithmic Trader can itself purchase 10,000 shares for
$100 each. Or, if it can reliably estimate which way the market is
headed, it can accumulate a big inventory of Public Company shares.
This strategy can be beneficial because this purchase raises the share
price of Public Company shares and may prompt other investors to also
become interested in purchasing them. In so doing, the Algorithmic
Trader can make money by selling back the 10,000 shares to the Mutual
Fund or to other investors at a higher price.
Operationally, order anticipation can work in several ways.
Where the Mutual Fund's order is not publicly displayed, for example,
if the order has been placed outside of an exchange, algorithmic traders
can engage in "pinging" to decipher whether a large order may be
lurking in the dark. Here, a trader uses algorithmic strategies to send
out "feelers" in the market as a means of detecting the larger order and
in which direction the order flow might be going. For example,
algorithms are routinely used to send out small "phantom" orders to see
if they match with another order. These feeler-orders are often
cancelled-indeed, almost 90% of orders in HFT are cancelled.88 But, if
85. Andrei Kirilenko et al., The Flash Crash: The Impact of High Frequency Trading on an
Electronic Market 1-2 (Sept. 24, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1686004 [http://perma.cc/8WAZ-58U2].
86. See Pradeep Yadav, Vikas Raman & Michel Robe, Man vs. Machine: Liquidity Supply
and Market Fragility (July 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
87. STAFFS OF THE CFTC AND SEC, supra note 23, at 45-57; see also Kirilenko et al., supra
note 85, at 2 (noting that HFT traders exacerbated the downward swing in the market by removing
liquidity).
88. E.g., Scott Patterson & Andrew Ackerman, SEC May Ticket Speeding Traders, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052970203918304577239440668644280 [http://perma.cc/LSC8-YR4N I (reporting 95-
98% cancellation rates for HFT firms).
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they match, they inform the program of a possibly larger order and the
direction in which other traders might be trading. Additionally,
algorithmic traders can engage in sophisticated computation and
pattern analysis to deduce how large traders might behave. This type
of order anticipation depends on algorithms successfully decoding
market trends through the use of data, statistics, and analysis, and
then getting ahead of the trends. Finally, where securities trade on
multiple venues, the Mutual Fund might need to trade on many such
platforms to fill a large order. An Algorithmic Trader can see that the
Mutual Fund has entered a large order on Exchange 1. It can then speed
ahead to Exchanges 2, 3, and 4 to purchase Public Company securities
which it can then sell back to the Mutual Fund.89
HFT traders have proven adept at implementing a variety of
order-anticipation strategies. When order anticipation involves
"pinging" for hidden order flows, HFT traders are well equipped to send
out large volumes of phantom orders at high speed. Relatedly, speed
advantages permit HFT firms to identify opportune orders and to trade
ahead of other investors and beat them to the punch.
Breaking up orders: Where the Mutual Fund wishes to enter into
a large trade, this news can alert other traders to an incoming
opportunity, one which they may wish to take advantage of through an
order-anticipation strategy (as above). 90 Without opportunistic traders
in the market, an investor would likely pay a lower price.
Traders benefit where they can control how they transact in
their large orders to avoid losing out to order anticipators and to ensure
that their order does not move the market. Large trades that can be
broken up into small segments allow traders to fly under the radar and
to avoid competitor attention falling on their trading strategy. 91 From
the systemic perspective, one-off large block trades can move the
market, potentially setting off abnormal price spikes that can disrupt
the market.92
Algorithms are helpful in organizing order flows to ensure that
block trades can be broken up and traded quietly without moving the
market. Pre-set formulae determine how much of the block to sell (or
buy) and at what price, helping route trades to venues where those
89. IOSCO Technical Comm., supra note 17, at 23-24 (describing HFT strategies employed).
For a detailed description, see U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, Concept Release on Equity Market
Structure, Release No. 34-61358 (Jan. 14, 2010), 56-58.
90. ARNUK & SALUZZI, supra note 36, at 1; MacIntosh, supra note 38, at 9-10.
91. Der Hovanesian, supra note 73.
92. The most extreme example here is provided by the May 2010 Flash Crash. Here, the SEC
and CFTC investigation traced the start of the crash to a very large "sell" order by a large
institutional investor. See STAFFS OF THE CFTC AND SEC, supra note 23, at 2-3.
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trades can be executed at the lowest cost.93 Algorithms can thus even
out sharp spikes in prices resulting from the sudden emergence of large
trades. Such algorithms hide block trades from view, only revealing a
partial picture of the overall trading strategy and preventing
opportunistic traders from purloining ideas. On the one hand, this
impairs a fulsome understanding of trading behavior. On the other,
algorithms reduce the costs to investors of entering the market. It can
help key investors participate in the market where they know they can
break up their big orders and avoid opportunistic traders from getting
to their best trades.
III. MARKET EFFICIENCY AND CAPITAL ALLOCATION
According to established economic theory, markets speak
through prices. When traders transact rationally with one another,
their interactions reveal what they know about a security and how
much they wish to pay to buy or sell it based on their knowledge and
risk preferences. 94 Markets are efficient when they facilitate this
exchange by reflecting the information and insights of traders in the
prices at which securities trade. Efficiency in processing information
can, in theory at least, also help foster better allocation of capital in
securities markets, so-called allocative efficiency.95 When investors can
easily understand what securities are worth, they can invest their
93. Hendershott et al., supra note 72, at 2-3 (noting that broker-dealers offer their clients a
"suite" of algorithms to help them to break large trades up into small blocks).
94. For early discussion, see JAMES LORIE & MARY HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET:
THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 70-75 (1973); WILLIAM F. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL
MARKETS 77-78 (1970); Sanjay Basu, Investment Performance of Common Stocks in Relation to
Their Price-Earnings Ratios, 32 J. FIN. 663, 663 (1977); Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance
Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1, 3-6 (1982);
Gilson & Kraakman, Mechanisms, supra note 24, at 554-65; Benoit Mandelbrot, Forecasts of
Future Prices, Unbiased Markets, and "Martingale" Models, 39 J. BuS. 242, 242-43 (1966); Robert
E. Verrecchia, Consensus Beliefs, Information Acquisition, and Market Information Efficiency, 70
AM. ECON. REV. 874, 874-75 (1980).
95. The literature in this area is vast and debated at length by academics in economics and
finance. For discussion, see, Franklin Allen, Stock Markets and Resource Allocation, in CAPITAL
MARKETS AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 81, 81-108 (Colin Mayer and Xavier Vives eds., 1993),
which notes the different capacities of country securities markets to allocate capital; FORESIGHT,
supra note 79, at 52-53; Jeffrey Wurgler, Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital, 58 J.
FIN. ECON. 187, 188-89, 210-12 (2000), which notes that financial markets help improve capital
allocation across the economy in an international survey; and Solomon Tadesse, The Allocation
and Monitoring Role of Capital Markets: Theory and International Evidence 5-6 (William
Davidson Inst., Working Paper No. 624, 2003). For a critical perspective on the ability of markets
to allocate capital efficiently, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Allocation Role of the Stock Market, 2 J.
FIN. 235, 235, 238 (1981), which notes that efficient capital allocation is difficult to observe
empirically and argues that competitive markets may not result in Pareto optimal resource
allocation solutions.
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capital in those enterprises that are likely to use it most productively
and profitably.
Legal academics and finance economists have, since the 1970s,
engaged in lengthy and often fraught analyses of the markers of market
efficiency-and whether markets are, in fact, efficient.96 The Efficient
Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH), the theory that security prices
reflect all available information,97 has enjoyed a devoted following as
well as dogged critics throughout its history. From its origins in finance
theory, the ECMH migrated in the 1980s into legal scholarship, growing
deep roots in securities regulation and corporate governance.98 While
this skepticism has softened the strictures of the ECMH, prices remain
a significant source of information for markets and regulators.
In outlining the central pillars of the ECMH and its key
critiques, this Part makes two points. First, despite the shortcomings of
the ECMH, scholars note that prices can be informative and helpful in
providing an approximate gauge of allocative value. 99 In other words,
informational value and more fundamental allocative values are linked,
even if imperfectly.100 Secondly, regulation has long relied on prices as
a window into fundamental allocative value. As detailed in this Part,
central notions in regulation and governance continue to hew closely to
96. See, e.g., Nicholas Barberis, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Model of Investor
Sentiment, 49 J. FIN. ECON. 307, 315-17 (1998) (discussing behavioral economics and specifically
the conservatism and representative heuristic in the context of efficient markets theory); J.
Bradford De Long, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers & Robert J. Waldmann, Noise Trader
Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. EcoN. 703, 704-06 (1990) (critically examining the role of
arbitrage in keeping markets efficient); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of
Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 413-16 (1970) (the seminal article on the subject
elaborating on the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis and theorizing that markets incorporate
available information in prices); Gilson & Kraakman, Mechanisms, supra note 24 (analyzing
factors that may lead to market efficiency); Robert J. Shiller, Fumiko Kon-Ya & Yoshiro Tsutsui,
Why Did the Nikkei Crash? Expanding the Scope of Expectations Data Collection, 78 REV. ECON.
& STAT. 156, 163-64 (1996) (discussing the workability of efficient markets in light of the Japanese
stock market crash). For a market microstructure perspective, see Paul G. Mahoney, Market
Microstructure and Market Efficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 541 (2003).
97. See Fama, supra note 96, at 384; see also Eugene F. Fama, Market Efficiency, Long-Term
Returns, and Behavioral Finance, 49 J. FIN. ECON. 283, 283-84 (1998) (discussing the ECMH in
the context of emerging behavioral critiques of the ECMH).
98. For excellent discussion, see Alon Bray & J.B. Heaton, Market Indeterminacy, 28 J. CORP.
L. 517, 535-37 (2003) (critiquing the operation of the ECMH in fraud-on-the-market cases).
99. Gilson & Kraakman, Mechanisms, supra note 24, at 551-53; Gilson & Kraakman,
Information Costs, supra note 24, at 10-12 (noting that even after the Financial Crisis,
informational efficiency is still relevant for determining fundamental value efficiency in the
market).
100. Gilson & Kraakman, Information Costs, supra note 24, at 7 ("We argue in this Article
that informational efficiency and fundamental efficiency are related; even if we cannot observe
fundamental efficiency, we can with confidence predict that making prices more informationally
efficient will move them in the direction of fundamental efficiency.").
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the ECMH. This reliance is not accidental. Rather, efficient markets
have long been useful to regulators as a mechanism to monitor and
encourage better capital allocation by linking key rules in this area to
securities market prices.
A. The Importance of Efficiency
In a now infamous quote, Professor Michael Jensen proclaimed
that, "there is no other proposition in economics which has more solid
empirical evidence supporting it than the Efficient Markets
Hypothesis."10 ' And, indeed, in its early history, the ECMH seemed
unassailable. 10 2 In elaborating the central theses, Professor Eugene
Fama posits that, in efficient markets, the price of a security fully
reflects all available information.103 In other words, it represents the
market's most accurate estimate of the value of a particular security
based on its riskiness and the future net income flows that investors
holding that security are likely to receive.104 Where efficient markets
exist, traders cannot profit by using existing information available in
the market, since this news should already be reflected in securities
prices. Rather, the market price of a security only moves with the
arrival of new information into the exchange.105
101. Michael C. Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN.
ECON. 95, 95 (1978); see also Richard Roll, Orange Juice and Weather, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 861, 871,
879 (1984) (showing that the futures market for oranges was often more accurate than the
National Weather Service in forecasting the weather).
102. See, e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, Mechanisms, supra note 24, at 549-50 ("[The ECMH is
now the context in which serious discussion of the regulation of financial markets takes place.");
see also William F. Sharpe, Discussion, 25 J. FIN. 418, 418 (1970) ("[I]n a well-functioning market,
the prices . . . [of securities] will reflect predictions based on all relevant . . . information. This
seems to be trivially self-evident to most professional economists-so much so, that testing seems
almost silly.").
103. Fama, supra note 96, at 383.
104. See Fischel, supra note 94, at 4-5; Gilson & Kraakman, Mechanisms, supra note 24, at
551-52; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of
the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1076-77 (1990).
105. Jensen, supra note 101, at 96 ("A market is efficient with respect to information ... if it
is impossible to make economic profits by trading on the basis of [that] information."). But see
Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient
Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 395 (1980) (arguing that markets cannot be informationally
efficient according to orthodox ECMH as if traders had no incentive to act on available information,
new information would never be incorporated into prices in the first place). For discussion, see
Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J.
CORP. L. 635, 640-42 (2003), which discusses the differences between informational and
fundamental efficiency and how information is "fully reflected" in securities market prices; and
William K.S. Wang, Some Arguments that the Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
341, 344-51 (1986).
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Professor Fama proposes three distinct versions of market
efficiency. How price "fully reflects" available information can be a
function of (i) weak; (ii) semi-strong; and (iii) strong forms of efficiency.
In their weak form, market prices reflect historical patterns of past
prices; the semi-strong version goes further to posit that prices
incorporate all publically available information; and, finally, the strong
version predicts that securities prices impound all information,
including non-public data that lies in the hands of corporate insiders
and others.106 Under the strong-form version of efficiency, insider
trading serves no profitable purpose: all public as well as confidential
information is always fully incorporated into the price at which
securities trade.107
Beyond simply describing versions of what kind of information
is relevant, the ECMH also presupposes a modality by which this
information comes to be absorbed into prices. At its most orthodox, the
ECMH assumes that traders transact in a manner that is rational, free
of bias, and unmoved by temporary fads and impulses.108 Traders
generate efficient prices by competitively trading on their rational
estimations of what a security is worth, based on available and relevant
information in the market. This reliance on rational, unbiased
expectations of asset prices underpins some key insights deriving from
the ECMH. Notably, efficient markets depend on arbitrage. That is,
conventional theory assumes that, when traders see prices that deviate
from an optimal price, they are immediately prompted to trade away
the difference. A trader that sees that a security is trading below the
trader's estimated value is motivated to buy that asset and to
eventually sell it at the price that the asset should be worth. The trader
thus brings the price closer to what it "should" be when publically
available information is taken into account.1 09 Arbitrage represents an
important dynamic that animates efficient markets, helping periodic
divergences from efficiency return to a state of equilibrium.
The assumption that traders act in a manner that is unbiased
offers a way to connect informational and fundamental-value efficiency.
Even if one trader incorrectly estimates prices, competing traders
106. See Fama, supra note 96, at 383-96, 404-10; see also EUGENE FAMA, FOUNDATIONS OF
FINANCE: PORTFOLIO DECISIONS AND SECURITIES PRICES 139-45 (1976) (discussing these forms of
efficiency and basis of establishing their applicability).
107. See Macey & Miller, supra note 104, at 1077-78 (discussing which form was favored by
the Court in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), which recognized the fraud-on-the-market
theory).
108. Stout, supra note 105, at 640-42 (providing a succinct analysis of the importance of
traders accurately valuing information according to set parameters).
109. Id. at 637-38.
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should step in to bring prices into line. Further, arbitrage as a corrective
mechanism works only when traders can spot that a security is
mispriced. Such traders must be able to notice that asset prices are
disconnected from what they "should" be-their true, fundamental
value."i0 Capturing fundamental value is a challenging task for any
theory. Some scholars argue that theories of fundamental value in asset
pricing are simply too complex to be attainable in practice."' However,
for proponents of the ECMH, the hypothesis offers a best, even if
imperfect, fit. Put differently, the ECMH works pretty well most of the
time."x 2 Egregious market failures, such as stock market crashes, can
undermine its reliability.113 While problematic, however, such events do
not necessarily defeat the theory in its entirety. Rather, they point to
occasional imperfections that also taint other theories of market
behavior. In short, the ECMH is the best the market has, and through
arbitrage, informed trading supports a broadly applicable theory of
value.114
110. Robert F. Stambaugh, Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?:
Discussion, 41 J. FIN. 601, 602-04 (1986) (arguing that the ECMH provides a relatively more
successful method of valuing assets); see also Lawrence E. Blume & David Easley, Learning to Be
Rational, 26 J. ECON. THEORY 340, 340-43 (1982) (noting the challenges of investors learning price
patterns and trading behaviors that help them to understand when prices are not at their correct
level); Bray & Heaton, supra note 98, at 521-522 (noting that reliable models of fundamental value
are virtually nonexistent and that arbitrage is unreliable).
111. E.g., ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION To BEHAVIORAL
FINANCE 1815-34 (2000) (discussing the interaction between behavioral finance and efficient
markets); Lawrence H. Summers, Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?,
41 J. FIN. 591, 592 (1986) (arguing for the difficulty of showing fundamental value efficiency); see
also Bray & Heaton, supra note 98, at 520-21 (arguing for market indeterminacy, a skepticism in
the ability of markets to reflect fundamental value); Stambaugh, supra note 110, at 601-02 (noting
the difficulty of developing tests of efficiency).
112. See, e.g., Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 533 (1986) ("[We can never know how far
away price is from value . ... I think almost all markets are efficient almost all of the time. 'Almost
all' means at least 90%.").
113. See SHLEIFER, supra note 111, at 1827-28 (noting failures of arbitrage in reference to the
Great Depression); Peter M. Garber, Tulipmania, 97 J. POL. ECON. 535, 543-44 (1989) (discussing
the market fundamentals that drove the tulip speculation); Shiller, supra note 96; see also S.P.
Kothari, Capital Markets Research in Accounting, 31 J. ACCT. & ECON. 105, 186-88 (2001) (noting
evidence of large abnormal returns that pose formidable challenges to the efficient market
hypothesis); Charles M.C. Lee, Market Efficiency and Accounting Research, 31 J. ACCT. & ECON.
233, 241 (2001) (discussing the difficulty of reconciling the volatility of stock returns with the
efficient market framework).
114. See Fama, supra note 97, at 288-91 (arguing that, while ECMH showcases certain
anomalies, anomalies emerging from theories of behavioral finance are just as, if not more,
problematic).
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B. Making Markets Efficient
The question of how market mechanisms actually reflect
information in prices has tested scholars seeking to explain the ECMH
and informationally efficient markets in practical terms. In their
seminal work, Professors Gilson and Kraakman identify four
"mechanisms" that, when left to interact, help efficient markets to
emerge: (i) universally informed trading; (ii) professionally informed
trading; (iii) derivatively informed trading; and (iv) uninformed
trading.115
At its simplest, universally informed trading describes the
quintessential state of efficient markets when traders possess all
available information and cannot gain or lose by transacting on that
information.
Professionally informed trading reflects the activity of expert
and informed players. Market analysts, industry experts, and
professional asset managers, though small in number, can cause the
market price to shift because of the information that their trading
reveals. These dynamics represent the workings of well-informed, so-
called "fundamental" traders that bridge informational and allocative
efficiency in practical terms. Informed traders invest in obtaining
private information to give them an edge over other market
participants. The better their information, the more likely they are to
make significant gains vis-a-vis uninformed and lesser-informed
traders. Their private interest generates public gains. When many
informed traders come together, each knowing something about
securities, their collective intelligence helps the market understand the
fundamental worth of an asset.116 When traders are informed about
what a security is worth or should be worth, they can act to ensure that
their capital is used most effectively by monitoring and disciplining
management.117
Derivatively-informed trading paints a more complex picture.
Instead of trading on information that they themselves possess,
derivatively-informed traders transact on the basis of patterns and
115. Gilson & Kraakman, Mechanisms, supra note 24, at 568-88.
116. There is considerable literature on the role of fundamental traders in deriving allocative
value. See notably, Anat Admati, A Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium for Multi-Asset
Securities Markets, 53 ECONOMETRICA 629, 629-30 (1985); Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 105, at
393-95; and Jiang Wang, A Model of Intertemporal Asset Prices Under Asymmetric Information,
60 REV. ECON. STUD. 249, 249-51 (1993).
117. See, e.g., Alon Bray, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism,
Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1730 (2008) (discussing the
influence that hedge funds have as informed monitors).
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trends they detect in the trading activity of professionally informed
traders. They focus on anticipating how professional traders are likely
to trade. The role of derivatively informed traders is important.
Derivatively informed traders can increase efficiencies by highlighting
the activities of professionally informed traders. When derivatively-
informed traders anticipate possible trends, they earn returns at the
expense of professional traders. But they also make sure that
professional, private information emerges into the market quicker and
at lower cost than if the market were to rely on the activities of
professional traders alone.118 Importantly, Gilson and Kraakman note
that such derivative traders only imperfectly and incompletely decode
information. Informed traders retain an edge and continuing incentive
to keep trading.
Finally, uninformed traders complete the picture. Uninformed
traders perform a "cleansing" role in the market. As much as markets
use factual information, they also include softer, uncertain data in the
realm of forecasts, predictions, and value judgments. Traders each have
their own particular view of the world. They cannot know what other
traders think and believe. But this information, in efficient markets,
should reach the markets anyway. Uninformed trading allows various
individual biases to cancel each other out, diminishing the chances that
the market reflects distorted prices skewed in favor of one or other
viewpoint. Uninformed traders are essential to the market. They help
ensure that it reflects a collective viewpoint, free of bias or
idiosyncrasies.
C. Prices and Capital Allocation
The ability of prices to function as a window into fundamental
value offers a powerful policy tool for monitoring and disciplining
economic actors. As finance theory has unraveled the fuller implications
of price efficiencies for capital allocation and governance, policymakers
have embraced prices as a central component of the regulatory arsenal.
1. Theory
From a theoretical standpoint, prices work to inform as well as
discipline companies that consume the risk capital of investors. Prices
perform an important expressive function for the market, aggregating
118. See Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 105, at 395-97 (identifying a paradox in this theory
by arguing that markets would go through a pattern of acquiring information and trading on it
until the market itself becomes aware of it, leaving no gains to be made; where no gains exist,
traders would stop trading until they came into new information).
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the viewpoints of a multiplicity of traders into a responsive, easily-
understood signal.119 This signaling offers valuable insights to investors
who do not have to internalize the full costs of investigation. Critically
for allocation, the expressive functionality of prices allows them to
function as a monitoring and disciplinary device for capital. A few
examples serve to illustrate their considerable power in governance.
First, market prices offer a signal of good or bad corporate
management. Notably, prices can incentivize mangers to be diligent in
pursuing the interests of the company. Tying managerial contracts to
share prices and total shareholder returns can give managers a
motivation to maintain firm performance and, by extension, the price
at which company securities trade.120 With incentives to keep the share
prices robust, managers should work hard to use investor capital
effectively. 121 Prices also help managers understand how they and the
company are performing. Managers can use prices as a way to glean the
opinion of outside investors about their performance. Prices can thus
work to create a monitoring and feedback mechanism between
managers and the market. 122
This functionality only works when markets operate efficiently.
As Professors Holmstrom and Tirole observe, firm monitoring works
best when markets are sufficiently liquid, meaning traders can enter
and exit markets easily. Liquid markets attract motivated, informed
speculators. With liquidity and informed investor participation,
markets and share prices can work effectively as monitoring devices for
managers. 123
Regulation and market practice, unsurprisingly, depend on
securities prices as a starting point for regulating executive
119. See, e.g., James Dow & Gary Gorton, Stock Market Efficiency and Economic Efficiency:
Is There a Connection? 2-4 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper Series, Working Paper
No. 5233, 1995) (discussing the signaling role of prices). For a critical perspective on using share
prices in corporate governance see, Lynn A. Stout, Share Price as a Poor Criterion for Good
Corporate Law 3-5 (UCLA School of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No.
05-07. 2005), http://ssrn.comlabstract=660622 [http://perma.cc/H9LG-E5HQ].
120. Carol Bowie, Steve Silberglied & Liz Williams, Evaluating Pay for Performance
Alignment, ISS GOVERNANCE SERVS. 1, 6-10 (2014), http://www.issgovernance.com/file/
publications/evaluatingpayforperformance.pdf [http://perma.cc/APQ6-GADP] (noting the
importance of total shareholder returns as a metric measuring corporate performance for
benchmarking executive performance).
121. See, e.g., Dow & Gorton, supra note 119, at 2-4.
122. Id. (noting the "bi-directional" feedback mechanism between markets and managers).
The literature on executive compensation and pay-for-performance is vast and outside the scope
of this Article. For a useful survey of the literature, see Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton & Ailsa Roell,
Corporate Governance and Control 58-65 (ECGI Fin., Working Paper No. 2/2002, 2002),
http://ssrn.comlabstract=343461 [http://perma.ccl8826-9A2J].
123. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring, 101 J.
POL. EcoN. 678, 679-80 (1993).
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compensation and performance. Among other performance metrics,
shareholders regularly look to shareholder returns when deciding
whether or not to informally approve management pay packages. 124
Rather than relying on nebulous expressions of corporate success, share
prices and shareholder returns offer observers a concrete, quantitative
measurement of executive performance. Prices can also reveal
manipulation by misbehaving managers. Option backdating and
insider trading, when managers artificially massage their pay by
secretly selling stock or making sure stock options vest in favorable
markets, are key examples. Securities prices are the starting point for
any analysis into such behavior. 1 2 5
Second, in addition to monitoring, price signals can also trigger
disciplinary mechanisms. Particularly significant is the market for
corporate control. As finance and economics scholarship richly details,
the market for corporate control works to punish managers that fail to
use capital optimally or that extract rents at the expense of firm
value.1 26 Prices allow corporate raiders to gauge whether the firm is
undervalued. Where share prices are low for reasons that do not
correlate with a slump in the market or some other systemic reason,
takeover specialists have incentives to exert discipline through a hostile
takeover. If they succeed, raiders can hope to see a rise in the share
price and a profit from their intervention. Selling shareholders may also
be motivated to sell to raiders. As shares trade at a low price, the
uncertainty risks and cost of keeping capital locked in the company may
be too high to justify retaining the shares on their books.1 27 The market
124. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203
§ 951, 124 Stat. 1899 (2010) (mandating non-binding, advisory shareholder say-on-pay votes for
public companies); Bowie, supra note 120, at 7-10 (noting the advantages of using shareholder
returns as a metric to measure executive compensation).
125. For summary, see Peter J. Henning, End of the Options Backdating Era, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Aug. 19, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/19/end-of-the-options-
backdating-eraP/r=0 [http://perma.cc/S5LR-ML9Z]. The literature in this area is vast.
126. See generally Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French, Industry Costs of Equity, 43 J.
FIN. ECON. 153 (1997) (noting the challenges of determining the price of equity); Sanford J.
Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and The Theory of the
Corporation, 11 BELL J. ECON. 42, 42-43 (1980); David Scharfstein, The Disciplinary Role of
Takeovers, 55 REV. ECON. STUD. 185, 185 (1988); Martijn Cremers & Vinay B. Nair, Governance
Mechanisms and Equity Prices 1-2 (Yale Int'l Ctr. for Fin, Working Paper No. 03-15, 2004)
(detailing the interaction between takeovers and shareholder monitoring); James Dow, Gary
Gorton & Arvind Krishnamurthy, Equilibrium Asset Prices Under Imperfect Corporate Control 2-3
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 9758, 2003).
127. See Scharfstein, supra note 126, at 186-87 (analyzing when shareholders will tender
their shares at low prices); see generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What
Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 789-96 (2009) (detailing the key factors
that can impede effective shareholder monitoring of corporate governance).
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for corporate control can thus provide a powerful motivator for weak
managers who may otherwise shirk their responsibilities.
Importantly, external discipline can work alongside internal
oversight mechanisms. As scholars note, a vibrant and liquid market
for a company's securities can motivate large shareholders to increase
their shareholding as a means of disciplining management, particularly
when prices fall. Shareholder monitoring, combined with external
monitoring by takeover activists, can enhance investor power and
create meaningful disciplinary constraints on managers. 128 Similarly,
external suppliers of credit can look to share prices to determine firm
value and investor expectations regarding a company's future
performance. Sudden changes in share price may suggest problems in
repaying debt-an invitation to lenders to exert greater control and
calibrate the cost and conditions attaching to the capital. 129
2. Implementation
At the level of practice, law and regulatory policy institutionalize
the interaction between information and allocative efficiency.
Policymakers have supported efficiency economics in two clear ways: (i)
by creating a system of laws to facilitate disclosure by public companies,
seeking to optimize monitoring and discipline; and (ii) by developing a
regulatory framework that looks to foster liquid markets, reducing the
entry costs facing investors seeking to trade.1 30
128. The literature on this issue is considerable. For discussion, see Paul A. Gompers, Joy L.
Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q. J. ECON. 107, 107-09
(2003); Charles J. Hadlock & Gerald B. Lumer, Compensation, Turnover, and Top Management
Incentives: Historical Evidence, 70 J. Bus. 153, 153-58 (1997); and Cremers & Nair, supra note
126.
129. Merritt B. Fox, Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung & Artyom Durnev, Law, Share Price
Accuracy and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 340-41 (2003);
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control,
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1047-70 (2007) (noting the rise of bondholder engagement in enforcing
loan covenants); Greg Nini, David C. Smith & Amir Sufi, Creditor Control Rights, Corporate
Governance, and Firm Value 28-29 (Nov. 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1344302 [http://perma.cclZ7SS-SGDG]. For a brief description of
takeover rules applying to public companies, see B. Jeffery Bell, The Acquisition of Control of a
United States Public Company, MORRISON FOERSTER (2015), http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/
Images/1302-The-Acquisition-of-Control-of-a-United-States-Public-Company.pdf [http://perma.cc/
5VTC-LVVV].
130. For an excellent early discussion, see Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions and
Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 853-56 (1992), which
discusses the persistent hold of the ECMH in legal scholarship despite the emergence of critiques
in financial economics; see also Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 24, 1243-45 (discussing the
importance of securing informational gains as the major role of securities regulation). For an
illuminating analysis on the centrality of efficiency in policy, see Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A.
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a. Mandatory Disclosure
Public investment in mandatory disclosure laws draws into
relief the central role played by market efficiency in capital
allocation.13 1 Disclosure constitutes the central imperative of the
securities-regulation framework. 132 Companies seeking to go public
provide markets with a substantial book detailing their inner workings.
Once their securities are on the market, companies provide investors
with routine updates about their activities and important changes to
their organization. 33
As Professor Merritt Fox observes, mandatory disclosure and
informationally efficient markets can strengthen capital allocation
within the economy. Mandatory disclosure reduces the search costs
involved for investors in procuring detailed information on public
companies. Investors face a lower investigative burden when seeking
out their choice investments and predicting their future cash flows from
the investment. 134 Where investors do not have to spend private capital
to discover value-relevant information, they can enter markets more
readily. And with reservoirs of accurate information, investors do not
have to discount their investments for the risks of expensive
investigation. Duplicative searches by investors are avoided. Market
Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761,
810-24 (1985), which casts doubt on relying on the ECMH as a basis for fashioning policy.
131. See Fox et al., supra note 129, at 338-41 (discussing how mandatory disclosure laws lead
to increased efficiency and beneficial effects on the allocation of resources).
132. Several scholars have argued that disclosure constitutes an unnecessary cost for firms
seeking to enter the public markets. In short, public firms would most likely disclose important
information of their own volition to attract capital without incurring a steep risk premium. See,
e.g., HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A
PURPOSE 232-65 (1979) (noting the shortcomings of mandatory disclosure); George Benston,
Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: Rejoinder, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 473, 473 (1975) (arguing
that variances in the returns emerging after passage of the 1933 Securities Act are not relevant);
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors,
70 VA. L. REV. 669, 669 (1984) (noting that protection against fraud and ensuring disclosure are
the two basic aims of the securities regulation framework). But see Coffee, Market Failure, supra
note 24; Fox et al., supra note 129, at 338-41 (arguing that mandatory disclosure leads to more
accurate share prices and more efficient markets).
133. Companies must produce a detailed registration statement under section 5 of the
Securities Act of 1933. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012). Public issuers must
complete periodic filings under sections 13(a), 13(c), 14, or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012).
134. On the further, indirect benefits of mandatory disclosure for governance see, John Core,
Luzi Hail & Rodrigo S. Verdi, Mandatory Disclosure Quality, Inside Ownership, and Cost of
Capital 1-2 (Oct. 24, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), which observes the reduction of inside
ownership as an indirect consequence of mandatory disclosure.
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analysts too benefit through dissemination of critical corporate
information. 135
Certainly, mandatory disclosure regimes are not costless. They
place a high burden on public companies in terms of production costs
and liability risks, as well as the loss of advantages that secrecy might
permit. But they also offer welfare gains for capital allocation.
Investors--or those that invest on their behalf like mutual funds-can
monitor public companies by exercising shareholder discipline over the
companies in which they invest. Managerial compensation can track to
company performance. The market for corporate control and takeovers
can step in to discipline management that fails to operate the business
to its full potential. Through price-signals, investors and third party
monitors can calibrate the cost of capital by better understanding the
fundamental value inhering within the company. 136
b. Constructing Structural Efficiencies
The SEC also routinely frames its policy goals for market
structure in the language of market efficiency. Essential rule making
in the area of market design, notably for the National Market System
(NMS) 137 as well as regulation of Alternative Trading Systems (ATS) 138
has expressly worked to institutionalize the ECMH in trading design.
The NMS establishes a nationwide market, connecting the country's
competing exchanges and securities platforms, to create a single
trading space. The NMS requires trading venues to disseminate
quotations for prices continuously. Price data is no longer the exclusive
property of the exchange on which it originates, but instead becomes a
public good shared across all exchanges in the interests of transparency
135. Gilson & Kraakman, Mechanisms, supra note 24, at 593-95 (noting the "central role of
information costs"); Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 24, at 1234 (discussing the importance
of market analysts for efficient markets); see also Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 130, at 813
(discussing whether the use of abbreviated registration statements restricts competitive research).
136. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 24, at 721-22 (discussing how mandatory disclosure may
improve the allocative efficiency of the capital market); Fox et al., supra note 129, at 344-45
(noting the signaling role of share prices in investment decisions).
137. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29 § 7, 89 Stat. 97, 111-17;
Regulation NMS-National Market System, Exchange Act Release No. 34-51808, 70 Fed. Reg.
37,496, 37,532 n.300 (June 29, 2005); see also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, MARKET 2000: AN
EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EQUITY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 17 (1994) ('The Division believes that
transparency plays a fundamental role in the fairness and efficiency of the secondary markets.
Transparency ensures that stock prices fully reflect information and lowers trading costs by
improving investors' ability to assess overall supply and demand.").
138. Regulation ATS-Alternative Trading Systems, 17 C.F.R. § 242.300(a) (2015).
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and efficiency. 39 The NMS requires execution of trades at the best price
anywhere in the NMS and has lowered broker fees by removing fixed
broker commissions. While such measures are designed to expand
investor access to securities markets, their avowed goal also extends to
ensuring that transactions are completed at the lowest transaction
cost.140
Similarly, Regulation ATS has sought to broaden the National
Market by including within its ambit a variety of newer, more informal
venues that bring customers together to trade securities.141 Not quite
exchanges, such alternative venues can compete on price with regulated
exchanges, encouraging a more competitive and liquid marketplace.
Under the NMS and Regulation ATS, securities can trade in multiple
markets, with continuous information flowing about prices throughout
the system. Traders can search across venues for their best trade and
execute this trade at the best price on the market. The NMS is designed
to speed up the arbitrage process to help prices move closer to their
efficient end-point. When prices diverge between trading platforms, low
transaction costs and a large NMS can encourage traders to seek out
opportunities for arbitrage, ensuring that markets become efficient
quickly and cost-effectively.
To be sure, the NMS has come under considerable critical
scrutiny from both practitioners and academics. Commentators have
remarked on its well-intentioned ambitions but troubled
implementation, which has produced over-complexity and exchanges
that compete too hard for business at the expense of standards.1 42 Still,
the clear aim of NMS and ATS is to encourage the liquidity and investor
participation needed for a vibrant, efficient market, a goal in keeping
with prevailing theory. In the absence of structural investments in
informational efficiency, the benefits offered by capital allocation go
unrealized. As prescribed by Holmstrom and Tirole, for example,
shareholder monitoring and the market for corporate control can wither
in the absence of the liquidity needed for investors and speculators to
139. For discussion, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, Capital Market Theory, Mandatory
Disclosure, and Price Discovery, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 843, 862-64 (1994). For critical analyses
of the National Market System, see Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC:
The Failure of the National Market System, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 315, 337-44 (1985); and Norman
S. Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC's National Market System,
56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 883, 957-58 (1981).
140. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, supra note 137, at 1-2 (describing the Division's
goals to achieve the broadest possible investor participation and lowest costs).
141. Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 688 (2013).
142. Jacob Bunge, A Suspect Emerges in Stock-Trade Hiccups: Regulation NMS, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303 2 8 1 5045 7 9 2 19962494432336
[http://perma.cc/36BA-97E2].
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enter the market cheaply and often. That policymakers have invested
deeply in crafting a regulatory framework to institutionalize the goals
of efficiency economics and support the promise of mandatory disclosure
should be unsurprising.
IV. INFORMATION EFFICIENCY VS. ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY
This Part explores the impact of algorithmic trading on
conventional theories of market efficiency-both informational and
allocative-from the perspective of regulation. It shows that, while
algorithmic trading fosters more short-term informational efficiency by
rapidly showcasing incoming news and data, it creates costs for longer-
term, fundamental allocative efficiency. This Part develops two strands
of argument. The first considers the impact of model and programming
risk (referred here together as "model risk")-that is, the risks of
algorithmic programming and models leaving gaps in analysis, making
incorrect assumptions, and adopting sub-optimal preferences in
interpreting information. With system-wide use of algorithms, the
question becomes whether prices remain fundamentally informative to
effectively act as a governance mechanism for capital allocation,
allowing investors to make decisions about corporate monitoring and
discipline. This Part suggests some ambivalence regarding model risks
in the market and allocative efficiency. While there are clear benefits to
models and algorithmic programming in terms of computation and
quantitative analysis, they invariably also leave gaps in information
that are hard to fill without parallel investment in fundamental
research.
The second line of argument claims that algorithmic markets
generate costs for informed investors seeking to make investments in
fundamental research. High-speed algorithms are skilled at
deciphering how informed traders are likely to transact and are able to
get to the most lucrative opportunities faster, reducing some of the
gains that may accrue to the informed trader. Losing out over time to
high-speed algorithmic traders, fundamental traders can see fewer
incentives to invest deeply in long-term research and investment.
Importantly, lower gains from research can also diminish the
motivation of fundamental traders to engage in governance of capital
markets, for example, in shareholder monitoring. The costs of
exercising such oversight can erode the gains of investment, especially
if payoffs are uncertain and long-term in nature.
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A. The Case for Informational Efficiency
Clearly, algorithmic trading offers many benefits for
conventional measures of market efficiency, with markets becoming
better able to reflect available information in prices quickly and
accurately. We know that algorithms react swiftly to emerging news
events. Indeed, studies show that the importance of speed for news-
based trading is paramount. 143 Even millisecond delays in reacting to
new information can significantly reduce returns for traders. 144 In one
study examining trading following scheduled macroeconomic news
releases, the authors observed that delays of three hundred
milliseconds reduced returns by 3.08%. Delays of one second diminished
returns by 7.33%.145 Given these reaction times, markets are
internalizing incoming news at a staggering pace, such that prices are
more responsive than ever before.146
We also know that algorithms are able to absorb an ever-
expanding reserve of data to inform trading. Beyond conventional data
sources like prices or macroeconomic indicators, algorithms are able to
collect and collate data from a diffuse range of sources. Social media
databases like Twitter or Facebook are especially popular for traders
seeking an edge in the market by accounting for prevailing sentiment
and likely trends. 147 With traders able to enter markets with large
quantities of data, securities prices should, in theory, reflect a rich
reserve of information in the prices at which securities trade. Within
this competitive, automated environment, there is little probability of
news passing unnoticed by algorithmic traders.
Additionally, algorithms can quickly spot and correct minor
discrepancies in prices, enhancing the effectiveness of arbitrage.
Pursuant to conventional theory, arbitrage constitutes a central
mechanism by which markets become efficient, scrubbing away
differences in prices between similar assets. Automated traders can
scan multiple markets in real time, spot price divergences, predict
143. Thierry Foucault, Johan Hombert & Joanid Rosu, News Trading and Speed (J. Fin., HEC
Paris Research Paper No. 975/2013, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=2188822 [http://perma.cc/NS4M-KBU3].
144. Id.
145. Martin L. Scholtus, Dick van Dijk & Bart Frijns, Speed, Algorithmic Trading, and
Market Quality around Macroeconomic News Announcements 4 (Tinbergen Institute, Discussion
Paper No. 12-121/111, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2174901
[http://perma.cc/J4SF-S24L] (noting that, after macroeconomic news releases, there is a good
chance that traders will trade in a similar fashion-e.g., that news of high unemployment might
lead to more selling).
146. Scholtus, van Dijk & Frijns, supra note 145, at 2-5.
147. PATTERSON, supra note 43, at 307.
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future variations in price, and ensure these are traded away rapidly.
With low search costs using algorithms, traders can afford to target
even small price differences: the payoffs may well be greater than the
costs involved in searching between markets. While current data on the
effectiveness of cross-market arbitrage is still limited, early evidence
points to tight relationships between related markets and closeness in
the prices of similar assets. This suggests that prices should be a more
accurate reflection of the underlying information in markets. 148
Each of these advantages-rapid reactions to news, data
processing, and arbitrage-is buttressed by sophisticated financial
modeling and programming that helps algorithms to value securities
for a best price.
Taken together, there are ample reasons to consider algorithmic
trading as a high-point for informationally efficient markets. Prices
rapidly reflect a wide range of information and are less vulnerable to
divergences. A number of prominent studies in the finance literature
speak to this intuition. 149 For example, as noted above, scholars find
that HFT algorithms trade in the direction of permanent price changes,
particularly with respect to large and liquid stocks.150 They note that
HFT algorithmic traders are adept at forecasting the future direction of
trading, at least over three to four seconds.1'1 Moreover, markets are
liquid, owing to high speed, high volume trading. This brings benefits
148. William Barker & Anna Pomeranets, The Growth of High-Frequency Trading:
Implications for Financial Stability, BANK OF CAN. FIN. SYs. REV., Jun. 2011, at 48-50; U.S. SEC.
& EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 58, at 11.
149. Brogaard, Hendershott & Riordan, supra note 21 (noting that HFTs promote price
efficiency by trading in the direction of permanent price changes); Allen Carrion, Very Fast Money:
High-Frequency Trading on the NASDAQ, 16 J. FIN. MKTs. 680 (2013) (finding that prices
incorporate information more efficiently on high HFT participation days); Alvaro Cartea,
Sebastian Jaimungal & Jason Ricci, Buy Low, Sell High: A High Frequency Trading Perspective
(Nov. 25, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1964781 [http://perma.cc/
RW6H-FELA] (arguing that lesser informed traders are adversely selected out of the market). For
a broader market quality rather than efficiency perspective, see Joel Hasbrouck & Gideon Saar,
Low-latency Trading, 16 J. FIN. MKTS. 646 (2013) (showing that HFT activity increased traditional
benchmarks of market quality in the current U.S. equity market structure notably with respect to
depth of limit order book and lower spreads).
150. Zhang, supra note 50, at 2-3 (arguing that HFT has increased short-term volatility and
showcases short-run efficiencies). But see criticisms of analyzing volatility and HFT in light of the
short time that HFT has been in the market and the challenges of drawing hard-and-fast causal
connections. Some commentators suggest that volatility might attract volatility, rather than
foment it in the market. For discussion, see FORESIGHT, supra note 79, at 64-65.
151. Brogaard et al., supra note 14; Jonathan Brogaard, Terence Hendershott & Ryan
Riordan, High Frequency Trading and Price Discovery (European Central Bank Working Paper
Series No. 1602, 2013); Sarah Zhang & Ryan Riordan, Technology and Market Quality: The Case
of High Frequency Trading (European Conference on Information Systems 2011 Proceedings,
Working Paper No. 95, 2011). For a more comprehensive review of the literature, see U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 58 at 8-12.
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for investors looking for vibrant, low-cost trading venues where they
can enter and exit cheaply and at will.152 In theory at least, this
heightened efficiency should point to more efficient capital allocation
across the economy.
B. The Problem of Allocative Efficiency
1. Model Risk
While quantitative models and advanced programming bring
considerable computational power to markets, they also generate risks
of information loss at significant cost to allocative efficiency. By design,
such models use theories from finance, mathematics, economics, and
statistics to abstract how different variables interact with one
another.1 53 Models routinely utilize simplifying assumptions about the
way the world works (e.g., that human beings trade rationally, or that
they have perfect information).15 4 In this way, models help carve out
pathways from cause to effect, making sense of large quantities of data
and variables to focus on those factors that are most salient to a trading
environment. 58 With strong models at work, algorithms can collect
enormous amounts of data as input and generate a credible output,
underpinned by finance theory, statistics, and historical observations
about market behavior.
But, models are also problematic. Commentators have long
expressed concerns about "model risk," meaning that models generate
overly stylized, simplified representations of otherwise messy economic
relationships. 15 6 Put more simply, models can be unreliable and
generate bad outcomes. The sources of such error can be numerous. For
152. See, e.g., Albert J. Menkveld, supra note 67, at 714 (noting the emergence of HFT traders
as market-makers and their prominent presence in major US exchanges); Nicholas Hirschey, Do
High Frequency Traders Anticipate Buying and Selling Pressure? 1-4 (Dec. 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2238516 [http://perma.cc/KN7A-QGYM] (showing that HFT
traders are able to predict the direction of order flows). But see Terrence Hendershott & Pamela
C. Moulton, Automation, Speed, and Stock Market Quality: The NYSE's Hybrid (Feb. 2, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.comlabstract=1159773 [http://perma.cclK6SJ-VJPQ]
(arguing that in NYSE's Hybrid Market, immediate execution increased spreads). For a
practitioner perspective, see US Equity Market Structure: An Investor Viewpoint, BLACEROCK
VIEWPOINTS, Apr. 2014, at 2-3 (stating some benefits of HFT from an investor perspective).
153. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 50, at 1-3 ("Models are
simplified representations of real-world relationships among observed characteristics, values, and
events.").
154. Allan Gibbard & Hal R. Varian, Economic Models, 75 J. PHILOSOPHY 664, 664-65 (1978).
155. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 50, at 1-3.
156. See, e.g., Kato & Yoshiba, supra note 54, at 131-33 (offering examples of various risks
affecting financial modeling).
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one, models and algorithmic programming can make incorrect
assumptions about how markets work. For example, human beings do
not always behave rationally when they trade.157 As a result, models
may give too much or too little importance to certain aspects of trading
like the various biases scholars regard as being endemic to human
beings and their trading behavior.158 Models may use outdated theories
and insights about financial products and their characteristics.1 59 Data
may be incorrectly interpreted to highlight certain patterns when these
do not reflect market reality. For example, algorithms may end up
"over-fitting" data to match a past or conventional trading strategy or
viewpoint rather than dealing effectively with new data.160 As Rishi
Narang, a well-known HFT trader, argues, algorithms can fit
information into existing models, even when analysis suggests that a
different approach would be more suitable. When Merrill Lynch merged
with Bank of America in 2008, he notes, the price of Merrill's stock rose
quickly. An unthinking algorithmic trader might have interpreted
Merrill's stock as overvalued, suggesting that selling the stock short
would be profitable. However, as Narang points out, there were good
reasons to think that Merrill's high stock price was actually justified
under the circumstances, a fact that conventional models may have
missed.161 In short, the trading outcomes generated by algorithms may
not always be sound.
Model risks also arise when algorithms fail to extract meaning
from the gigabytes of data flooding the market. In other words,
algorithms can err in mining data for information. 62 Algorithms may
over-value some data, under-emphasize it in other cases, make
mistakes, and fail to check its truthfulness. This danger is especially
live in the case of high speed, high volume algorithms designed to
respond in milliseconds to incoming information. Estimated to be
157. ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
2-4 (2000); Barberis, Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 96, at 315-17; Garber, supra note 113, at 543-
44; Shiller, Kon-Ya & Tsutsui, supra note 96, at 163-64.
158. See generally DAVID DREMAN, THE NEW CONTRARIAN INVESTMENT STRATEGY (1979)
(discussing irrational market trends and the investors who succumb to them); DANIEL KAHNEMAN,
THINKING FAST AND SLOW 269-363 (2011) (describing several ways human choice tends to deviate
from rationality); HERSH SCHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR: BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING (2000); David Hirshleifer, Investor Psychology and Asset Prices, 56 J.
FIN. 1533 (2001) (discussing trading biases and asset prices).
159. Kato & Yoshiba, supra note 54, at 130.
160. Yael Grushka-Cockayne, Victor Richmond R. Jose & Kenneth C. Lichtendahl Jr.,
Ensembles of Overfit and Overconfident Forecasts (Darden Business School, Working Paper No.
2474438, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2474438 [http://perma.cc/45HC-8MVP] (discussing
machine learning algorithms and the risk of data overfit and overconfidence in interpretation).
161. NARANG, supra note 40, at 15-16.
162. See id.
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responsible for around seventy percent of all equity trading volume on
U.S. markets, HFT algorithms must be precision programmed to
capture enormous amounts of data and to rapidly extract meaning from
this input.163 Traders face a significant technical challenge when
building HFT algorithms capable of absorbing swaths of data, ascribing
a "value" to information and transacting on that basis.164 Programming
errors in collecting and collating data input can easily arise, causing
problems for markets seeking to understand how to value securities in
real time. On December 1, 2014, for example, Apple Inc. lost almost
forty billion dollars in value owing to unexpected price swings in Apple's
shares. Shortly after the start of the trading day, 6.7 million Apple
shares changed hands within a one minute period, losing over three
percent in value in that short time. While the cause of the surprise sell-
off was unclear, its impact was felt across the market.165
Model risks are certainly not new. Moreover, the alternative,
relying on human brains and intuition, is also far from perfect and is
certain to leave deep gaps in data collection and analysis. The challenge
for markets lies not in the bare fact of model risks but in its extent. In
other words, a market that depends heavily on algorithms across a
growing list of security classes generates modeling risk on a system-
wide scale. Trading firms develop their own, in-house proprietary
models. Regarded as the "secret sauce" for success, firms face
competitive pressures to ensure that their particular algorithm
emerges a winner by virtue of its superior, speedier, and smarter
programming. 166 To stay profitable against their peers, firms have every
incentive to invest in models that are sophisticated and complex, able
163. Christian T. Brownlees & Giampiero M. Gallo, Financial Econometric Analysis at Ultra-
High Frequency: Data Handling Concerns (Universita' di Firenze, Dipartimento di Statistica G.
Parenti, Working Paper No. 2006-3, 2006) (noting the technological challenges of recording and
processing Ultra High Frequency Data).
164. Kearns & Nevmyvaka, supra note 18; NARANG, supra note 40, at 43-45.
165. Chuck Mikolajczak, Apple Tumbles As Much As Six Percent in Unusual Trading,
REUTERS (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/02/us-apple-shares-
idUSKCNOJF2M420141202 [http://perma.cc/AYS8-YWPG].
166. See Michael Lewis, Did Goldman Sachs Overstep in Criminally Charging Its Ex-
Programmer?, VANITY FAIR (Sept. 2013), http://www.vanityfair.cominews/2013/09/michael-lewis-
goldman-sachs-programmer [http://perma.cc/89SD-RZ8C] (discussing the case of a programmer
jailed for allegedly stealing Goldman Sachs' trading algorithm); Felix Salmon & Jon Stokes,
Algorithms Take Control of Wall Street, WIRED (Dec. 27, 2012), http://www.wired.com/2010/12/
ff_aiflashtrading/ [http://perma.cc/58V6-AFFC]; Tommy Wilkes & Laurence Fletcher, Special
Report: The Algorithms Arms Race, REUTERS (May 21, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/news/
picture/special-report-the-algorithmic-arms-race?articleId=USBRE84KO7320120521&slideld=
609573702 [http://perma.cclY23G-8QXK].
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
to scan ever-greater volumes of data, and use high finance and
computation to better implement their trading strategy. 167
This systemic proliferation of model risk leads to three basic
concerns. In the first instance, markets suffer from profound
information asymmetries generated by an incomplete understanding of
trading models and the gaps they leave. Trading firms construct
individual models that are largely impervious to outside scrutiny.
Unless traders make a mistake or cause a glitch in trading, it is unlikely
that underlying models will come to the attention of other traders or
regulators. Rather, algorithms and their mechanics constitute a
trader's prized assets whose protection is assured by laws safeguarding
industry trade secrets.168 In the absence of transparency, assumptions
cannot be tested, programming questioned, or outcomes understood
through an analysis of the process by which they are generated. To the
extent that models in algorithmic trading are designed to predict a
future state of affairs, understanding the bases governing these
projections is essential to filling in mistakes, correcting forecasts,
overfit, and biases, for example. From a broader standpoint, this lack of
transparency raises a basic inquiry: .given their prevalence and
significance for prices, are such model risks and imperfections part of
the market information that traders should internalize to achieve
optimal efficiency?
Second, the systematic nature of model risk combined with the
absence of external scrutiny creates incentives for firms to heighten the
complexities and capacities of their algorithms. Errors may follow.
Specialist trading outfits invest heavily in developing algorithms and
in operationalizing them for trading.169 To prevent algorithms from
going stale, their technology must be maintained, past performance
tested, and refinements added to best ensure that firms do not lose
ground to competitors. Recent years have seen a pronounced turn to
cutting edge technologies like "neural networks," "genetic algorithms,"
or artificial intelligence as a way for traders to gain an edge in the
marketplace. 170 In all, traders deal with an expensive trade-off. On the
one hand, they face the constant cost of building, upgrading, and testing
167. FORESIGHT, supra note 79, at 132-36.
168. See, e.g., Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39 (2012); United States
v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 74-75, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2012); Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of
2012, S. 3642, 112th Cong. (2012).
169. See, e.g., Brendan Conway, Wall Streets Need for Trading Speed: The Nanosecond Age,
WALL ST. J. BLOG (Jun. 14, 2011, 4:38 PI), http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2011/06/14/wall-
streets-need-for-trading-speed-the-nanosecond-age/ [http://perma.cc/B2CS-3EXY].
170. See, e.g., Kearns & Nevmyvaka, supra note 18. While a detailed analysis of these
technologies is outside of the scope of this Article, these are discussed in depth in FORESIGHT,
supra note 79.
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their algorithms. On the other, if they do not wish to pay, they confront
a starker cost, both reputational and monetary, of leaving the market
or diminishing their role in it. Arguably, once capital has been sunk in
developing algorithms and building an infrastructure to support them,
traders may be more likely to choose the former over the latter.
Immediate losses are likely to loom large. In contrast, the cost of future
losses is more uncertain.
Third, constant innovations in algorithmic markets heighten
model error and information loss already present within a highly
automated environment. Errors can arise owing to the very fact of
constant model updating and innovation. Errors can also arise because
new models are constantly being developed to deal with new types of
data and unknown future market circumstances. Within today's heavily
automated environment where real-time intervention by human beings
is often impossible, markets function as an arena for the real-world
testing of predictive algorithms. Errors are probable, even to be
expected, given that algorithms are likely to encounter data and market
environments that they have not seen before.
In this context, it is questionable whether individual firms fully
internalize the costs of algorithm error and testing. The opacity of
modeling and the status of algorithms as firm secrets mean that
detection costs of any mistake are high. Other firms, exchanges, or
regulators are unlikely to investigate unless the errors are of sufficient
magnitude to warrant investigation. Low-level, routine errors,
mistakes, and glitches may fly under the radar unless the damage they
cause is extensive.
Empirically, the study of model risks and their costs for markets
is in the early stages, making credible causal links hard to draw. Still,
some academics are observing anomalous trading behavior in securities
that may be seen as reflecting the challenge of model risks in automated
markets. In one notable study, the authors reported a sharp rise in so-
called "ultra-fast extreme events," crashes and spikes in the price of
securities for instances lasting less than 1,500 milliseconds. The
authors noted the occurrence of 18,520 crashes and spikes between the
years of 2006-2011.171 In seeking to explain some of the price
fluctuations, Professors Dugast and Foucault examine the trade-off for
market players between trading fast on new information and waiting to
check the veracity and value of new data. They posit that, particularly
when information is cheap, traders often trade twice: once when they
171. Neil Johnson et al., Abrupt Rise of New Machine Ecology beyond Human Response Time,
NATURE SCIENTIFIC REPORTS (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.nature.com/articlessrep02627
[http://perma.cc/Q4F7-D6MB].
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receive the signal; and a second time when they are better placed to
process it more carefully. Price fluctuations, they suggest, can arise
from this dynamic of traders moving quickly and then correcting their
forecasts over time. Looking more broadly, Professor Frank Zhang
notes that HFT algorithms contribute to stock market volatility,
particularly in the stock of the top three thousand companies (measured
in market capitalization). 1 72 Zhang suggests that HFTs routinely
overreact to news relating to the fundamentals of a traded security
when the level of HFT trading in the market is high. 17 3 These incidences
of mini-crashes and volatilities might point to the possibility of errors
or uncertainties in programming and the challenges of correcting them
in a timely way. 174
2. Creativity versus Constraint
Traders face a delicate trade-off in designing their algorithms:
algorithms must be creative in their ability to react to changing
markets while also precisely programmed, predictable, and set within
tight parameters that their programmers can control. Put simply,
traders need to balance creativity and constraint in algorithmic design.
This trade-off is significant for a number of reasons. Constraint
provides a way for traders to provision for their risks and rewards ex
ante. With clear, preset rules governing their algorithms, traders have
a better idea about how their algorithm is likely to transact in the real
world and to ensure they are properly prepared. In dealing with a
predictive program, ensuring that traders fully understand the
potential of their algorithm before using it is of paramount importance.
But, creativity is also desirable. Particularly at speeds that are too fast
for human reaction, when transactions are underpinned by large
reserves of data and computation, algorithms trade independently of
their human programmers. Ensuring that algorithms are creative and
capable of adapting strategies to real-time trading enables complex,
ultra-fast algorithmic trading to take place. Ultimately, the fine lines
drawn between creativity and constraint allow firms to understand
their liability risks and impact on the market.
Because algorithms are constrained by their programming, their
ability to recognize and react to circumstances outside of their
instructions is limited. When algorithms contend with input from the
market that is unusual, their reactions become much less predictable
172. Zhang, supra note 60, at 2-3.
173. Id.
174. Id. But see generally Brogaard, supra note 14 (suggesting that HFTs can reduce
volatility).
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and more likely to trouble programmers and other traders. Complex
language, for example, that includes stylized turns of phrase, irony, or
humor presents one such problem.1 75 As one study observes, algorithmic
traders show themselves as being adept at interpreting "hard"
information like facts, figures, and data over softer, more contextual
input. 176
A more significant source of risk lies in dealing with complex
economic environments, notably extreme market events, like a crash,
shifting geo-politics, or sudden mechanical glitch. Catastrophes are
difficult and costly to include in programming. Crises are inherently
unpredictable. Their eventual seriousness and scope is similarly
unknown. Past historical data, while helpful, is unlikely to offer the
certainty needed for algorithms to be able to trade in an orderly way
when crises do arise. In such cases, the chances of model error are likely
to be especially pronounced. Models might be tested against past data,
but they may be particularly prone to fail when confronted by new and
abnormal events. Predictive programming faces tall odds in matching
preset operations to unexpected, real-world events.
This challenge is exacerbated by algorithms reacting with pre-
programmed certainty to situations in which uncertainty is endemic.
Professors Biais et al., have observed that traders confront deep
uncertainties in times of crisis. When trouble arises, traders must re-
evaluate their strategies, re-calculate reserves of available funds, and
revise internal risk limits. Overcoming this "preference uncertainty"
requires time and flexibility to adapt to an evolving market. Pre-set
algorithms are likely to be acutely troubled by such uncertainties,
making algorithmic decision-making in crises more unpredictable and
prone to error.'77 Crises demand that algorithms be creative. Precisely
programmed constraints, however, strain algorithmic competence when
it is needed most by the market.
175. Ira Basen, Age of the Algorithm, MAISONNEUVE MAGAZINE (May 9, 2011),
http://maisonneuve.org/article/2011/05/9/age-algorithm/ [http://perma.cclDM3G-MEX7]
(illustrating this problem with an example from the Washington Post: the print edition headline
read "Better Never than Late" when Conan O'Brief left NBC, but online, the Washington Post
headline was "Conan 0' Brien Won't Give Up Tonight Show Time Slot to Make Room for Jay
Leno"); Richard Waters, Unthinking Algorithms Pull Off Clever Parlor Tricks, FIN. TIMES (Jul. 30,
2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6031dac8-170f-11e4-bOd7-00144feabdcO.html #axzz3o7OfGQli
[http://perma.cc/CYY4-R8G8]. A full discussion of the limits of artificial intelligence is outside the
scope of this Article.
176. Zhang & Riordan, supra note 151.
177. Cf. Bruno Biais et al., Equilibrium Pricing and Trading Volume Under Preference
Uncertainty, 81 REV. ECON. STUD. 1401, 1402-03 (2014) (noting the complex, lengthy (and human)
process of adjusting positions in times of high preference uncertainty, as in a market liquidity
shock).
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In emerging studies, the costs of constraint in algorithmic
programming are gaining prominence. In a prominent study on the May
2010 Flash Crash, when the Dow Jones fell almost one thousand points
in minutes before rebounding, the authors highlighted the challenges
posed by algorithmic constraint. On the day of the Flash Crash, the
study observed a day of general background stress in the market owing
to a variety of factors like the European sovereign debt crisis. When a
Kansas-based mutual fund sent an order to try and dispose of seventy-
five thousand futures contracts, the fund's algorithm precipitated a
market-wide sell-off that rapidly mushroomed into what became the
Flash Crash. In its conclusions, the authors did not blame algorithms
for starting the crisis. However, they did suggest that algorithms may
have contributed to its rapid escalation. When the large order arrived
into a market that was already troubled, many HFT traders suddenly
exited the market. Unable to cope with the selling pressure, HFT
algorithms simply shut down, draining the market of its major
providers of liquidity and feeding the negative spiral in security
prices.178 Similarly, in another study, Professors Raman et al., show
that, in a comparison between the performances of human versus
machine during periods of market stress, human judgment prevailed.
With the ability to transact more flexibly, human traders delivered
stronger outcomes than algorithmic counterparts. Here, the authors
underscore the superior performance of human traders in dealing with
complex economic environments to deliver more efficient trading
outcomes. Algorithms, on the other hand, suffered likely on account of
constraints built into their programming.1 79 How generally applicable
178. STAFFS OF THE CFTC AND SEC, supra note 23; see also Kirilenko et al., supra note 85.
This conclusion is not accepted by some commentators. For example, the research firm Nanex
suggests that the buyers of the mutual fund's contracts acted too aggressively in selling the
contracts causing the crash. For discussion, see May 6th 2010 Flash Crash Analysis: Final
Conclusion, NANEX, (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.nanex.net/FlashCrashFinal/FlashCrashAnalysis
-Theory.html [http://perma.ce/J2P5-36RY]. It should be noted that, in April 2015, the CFTC
proposed that the May 2010 Flash Crash may have been precipated by the trading of a disruptive
individual trader-Navinder Sarao, a lone trader operating from the United Kingdom-whose
manipulative "spoof' orders caused such an imbalance as to have triggered the Flash Crash. For
discussion, John Cassidy, The Day Trader and the Flash Crash: Unanswered Questions, NEW
YORKER (Apr. 23, 2015) http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/the-day-trader-and-the-
flash-crash-unanswered-questions [http://perma.cc/R9ED-PXHQ].
179. Yadav et al., supra note 86 (authors having reviewed the National Stock Exchange in
Mumbai, India for their study). But see Brogaard et al., supra note 14. Brogaard argues that
algorithms help in controlling volatility in the market in periods of extreme price stress. Brogaard
et al. focus on days on which there is high information in markets-for example, after major
announcements-and suggest that HFT algorithms mediate this volatility well. As highlighted by
Brogaard and others, algorithms do well in processing short-term information in markets, so it
seems to follow that they perform well to control volatility on days when information in the market
is high.
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their conclusions may be remains to be seen by further empirical
investigation. Still, it is at least debatable that the performance of
algorithms in crisis raises serious concerns.
From one perspective, it is not rational for traders to spend
money on developing programming and models for dealing with market
stress. Not only are such events relatively infrequent, but they are also
expensive to predict. Historic data is less informative in this context.
Crisis events are unique, making programming less durable in its
application to multiple scenarios. Programming is likely to require
considerable investment for developing the sophisticated, creative
systems necessary to cope with crises that come around only rarely.
With high costs balanced against the infrequency of market crises, it
makes sense for traders to opt for a solution that is predictable and
effective. In other words, it is rational for traders to build systems that
deal with the worst-case scenarios, with blunt, one-size-fits-all tools
that shut down activity and ensure the trader can exit the market as
quickly as possible. Traders limit the private costs to themselves,
though risks can shift to the market as a whole.
A central question, however, is whether algorithmic programs
are able to "discount" or otherwise provision for the possibility of crisis
in its programming and the prices at which securities trade.
Particularly where markets may be under stress and in crisis, it seems
worthwhile asking whether algorithmic programming is able to
incorporate this information into trading behavior. On the one hand,
algorithms will take their cue from a variety of informational sources
and respond to trends and investor expectations. On the other,
algorithmic traders can have less at stake in the event that a crisis does
strike. Rather than stay on the market to keep trading, a rational
response for algorithmic traders is to leave as quickly as events fall
outside of normal programming. Where exit is cheap, relative to the
market as a whole, it raises questions about the ability of algorithms to
properly reflect the risks in the market in the prices at which they
transact.
3. Implications for Capital Allocation
This Part highlighted a peculiar dichotomy in algorithmic
markets: while automated markets bring efficiencies, helping prices
reflect large reserves of information rapidly, they can also generate
information loss. Model error on a system-wide scale can leave gaps and
create difficulties in adapting to new and unexpected conditions and in
forecasting long-term changes in prices.
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These sources of information loss are deeply significant for
capital allocation and regulatory policies that seek to foster it. First,
information loss through model error is pervasive and expensive to
mitigate. Conventional theories of market efficiency assume that
traders each bring individual slivers of information to the market. Some
may be uninformed or trade based on derived data, but their particular
trading practices add to price formation by offering insights about
investor views and expectations.180 However, model risks present a
costly challenge for investors to overcome despite the informational
advantages that individual traders may have. At first glance, it seems
at least conceivable that investors might try and deal with gaps in
trading models by discounting for the risk of information loss in prices.
Investors could analyze common algorithms and question their
assumptions and methodology to eventually arrive at a determination
of the proper "discounting" to apply. By recognizing the gaps left by
algorithms, investors can then undertake the research desirable to fill
in the missing pieces of the picture. 181
Despite the intuitive appeal of discounting for model risks, the
task appears decidedly complicated in practice. Not only are trading
models tightly-guarded secrets, impervious to scrutiny from outside
investors, but their interactions cannot easily be predicted by looking
at single algorithms alone. Analyzing just one algorithm is likely to
convey little about how that algorithm will transact in the real world
when it meets and interacts with others in the market. For example, it
is questionable whether a study of one of the market-making algorithms
operating during the Flash Crash would have offered any hint of the
potential for cascading failure caused by its use in dynamic markets.
Investors need to analyze a broad totality of model and algorithms in
the market to garner a sense of the systemic errors, biases, and gaps
left behind. Clearly, this task presents an impossible hurdle to
overcome for single investors if not also for regulators overseeing
markets as a whole.
A querying perspective might argue that a failure to discount for
model errors should not really matter. Informational efficiencies in the
market offer a sufficiently clear idea of the market's view about a
particular security, meaning that it is unnecessary to work out the
implications of ad hoc gaps for the purposes of capital allocation.
Despite its appeal, however, this perspective has shortcomings. Model
risks are numerous and systematic. It is impossible to deduce which
180. Gilson & Kraakman, Mechanisms, supra note 24 at 565-57.
181. As the Federal Reserve notes in its guidance, this kind of "discounting' process is a
common way to make the stylized operations of models match reality.
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ones matter and which ones do not without deeper, empirical analysis.
For example, even simple modeling errors may assume outsize
importance when they are replicated by many traders in the market,
amplifying their impact. 182
Second, programmers are likely to see greatest predictability
when transacting in the very short, rather than long term. Looking
further ahead into the future is harder than looking into what is likely
to happen in the next few seconds. Model risks may be more endemic to
longer-term versus short-term models, requiring longer-term
programming to be sophisticated, creative, and adaptive to a
multiplicity of moving variables. Still, looking into the future is what
matters for capital allocation.
Broadly speaking, capital allocation necessitates meaningful
engagement with the inner workings of public companies to understand
not just the broad strokes but also the substantive details of their
conduct. Calibrating pay for performance, sizing up a hostile takeover,
or pushing shareholders to discipline directors require granular
engagement in analyzing the minutiae of corporate life. In automated
markets, however, programming algorithms to place a value on such
long-term fundamentals is expensive and its rewards uncertain. These
costs arguably create incentives for traders to concentrate on building
short-term trading models. Due to their focus on immediate market
movements, short-run algorithms deliver greater predictability and
allow traders to better strike the balance between creativity and
constraint.
This set of incentives suggests that the gains of rapid
algorithmic trading may be skewed in favor of short rather than long-
term forecasting. Indeed, empirical studies from finance academics
have shown algorithmic markets capable of reacting quickly to
emerging, immediate news. How persuasively they also absorb
information about longer-term fundamentals, however, remains open
to question. HFT traders, driving the bulk of liquidity in U.S. equity
markets, have the greatest incentive to understand the information
needed for the very short-term future. They react to news that is
relevant for driving immediate directionality and not much more,
responding to choice words and phrases in disclosures rather than
wading through their deep detail.183 This narrow focus poses concerns
for price quality in the context of more fundamental information.
182. See, e.g., Chaboud et al., supra note 21 (discussing the correlated trading of HFT traders).
183. See, e.g., High-frequency Trading: Profiting from News, WHARTON, UNIVERSITY OF
PENNSYLVANIA (Apr. 15, 2014), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edularticlelhigh-frequency-
trading-profiting-news/ [http://perma.ccN8UR-SEL5].
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Longer-term traders may have less immediate impact on price
formation, which falls within the special expertise of high-speed
automated traders. 184 As discussed below, they may only intervene
where the prices diverge sufficiently from fundamental value as to
justify entering the markets to trade-in other words, where the
various transaction costs are less than the possible gains on offer.
Third, it is also worth recalling that algorithmic markets are, in
some studies at least, strained under conditions of market stress.185
Where their programming is unable to react to novel, volatile
environments, algorithms can distort price formation. Indeed, as
algorithms are able to exit the market quickly, they may fail to properly
discount for the possibility of reckoning with and pricing in extreme
conditions. When looked at from the point of view of capital allocation,
this issue is problematic. Pressures on allocation of capital are usually
greatest in periods of market stress. However, just when monitors need
prices to be most robust to allow for oversight and discipline, price
formation mechanisms in algorithmic markets may be at their most
tenuous.
C. The Challenge for Informed Traders
Information losses through model errors create gaps in
knowledge for investors. On one level, these instances of information
loss represent a boon for the informed, research-orientated investor. By
delving deeply into fundamental research, such investors can make
reasoned investments and, through their trading, contribute to market
efficiencies. However, from another perspective, algorithmic trading
also creates costs for fundamental investors. These costs reflect the
pressures faced by such investors to adapt to new, highly automated,
ultra-fast markets. Investment in technology becomes necessary to
interpret growing amounts of data and high-volume order flows. But,
more significantly, the rise of order anticipation strategies as well as
the ability of HFT traders to capture prize orders quickly across
fragmented markets raises a further problematic prospect. Informed
investors do the work, but high-speed traders take a cut of their
winnings.186 Where informed investors lose incentives to undertake
research, instances of model errors, missing gaps, and perspectives in
automated trading go uncorrected.
184. See Yesha Yadav, Insider Trading and Market Structure, 63 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming
2016) (noting the structural advantages that HFTs enjoy in accessing exchange information and
in price formation).
185. Yadav et al., supra note 86.
186. See generally LEWIS, supra note 25 (providing a popular account).
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1. Anticipating Informed Orders
Algorithmic trading is introducing a potentially costly challenge
to informed traders. The speed and sophistication of algorithmic traders
generates friction between established, informed, fundamental traders
and new algorithmic actors angling to free-ride on their research.
In their taxonomy, Professors Gilson and Kraakman explain
efficiency as emerging from the interaction of four basic types of traders:
(i) universally informed traders that possess information already
circulating with the market; (ii) professionally informed traders that
invest in research and private information; (iii) derivatively informed
traders that seek out how professionals trade before deciding how best
to trade themselves; and (iv) uninformed traders that, in the aggregate,
reduce bias through their uninformed but privately opinionated
perspectives.1 87 This taxonomy has generated considerable commentary
in scholarship. Still, it helps in illustrating the larger dynamic driving
informed trading and the basic trade-offs motivating each type of actor.
The advent of algorithmic trading, and HFT in particular, re-
shapes these relationships within the market. Algorithmic markets
disincentivize more informed, professional traders from bringing their
private knowledge to the market. Usually, these informed actors
maximize their gains by trading quickly and forcefully on their private
information. The longer they wait, the greater the chances that their
information loses value. 188 With their first-mover advantage,
professionally informed traders can enjoy an upside. Moreover, they
add to efficiencies by infusing markets with their information. 89
However, HFT actors can erode the first-mover advantage that
professionally informed traders have enjoyed. With their technical
know-how and high-speed advantage, algorithmic traders are able to
free-ride off the information of informed traders through order-
anticipation strategies. Free-riding represents a rational trading
strategy for algorithmic traders, one that reduces their participation
costs and increases trading gains. Algorithmic traders are well-
equipped to discover how a professional trader is likely to transact.
Recall that order anticipation strategies encompass a variety of
techniques. These can include sending out dummy orders to see if any
187. Gilson & Kraakman, Mechanisms, supra note 24, at 568-88.
188. Brogaard, Hendershott & Riordan, supra note 21; Martin Scholtus, Dick van Dijk, High
Frequency Technical Trading: the Importance of Speed, Working Paper, 2-5 (2012) (noting that
even fifty milliseconds of delay can substantially reduce gains).
189. Gilson & Kraakman, Mechanisms, supra note 24, at 561-62 ("In the broadest sense,
information is data that has the capacity to alter one's beliefs about the world or, in our more
limited context, one's beliefs about the appropriate price of an asset.").
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match, thereby revealing the existence of a large order. 190 Or, in today's
system of fragmented exchanges where securities are listed on multiple
venues, an HFT trader can see a large trade on one exchange and run
ahead of other traders to capture or sell those same shares on other
venues in the system. 191 Speed and technology enable the HFT trader
to get ahead of its more informed competitor. When this happens, and
the HFT captures the best price, the informed trader might see the
market move against her, eroding her gains and diminishing her
advantage in the market. These advantages can be meaningful. This is
especially likely where an informed trader wishes to transact in a
variety of securities in the market, not just the shares of one company,
to include options and futures and securities of related companies.
Speed and anticipatory intelligence enable HFT traders to purchase
substitute securities and to trade them before a professional trader is
able to complete her transaction. For the HFT, this move captures the
informed upside and reduces further gains that might accrue to
professionals. 192
Indeed, order anticipation may be a systematic strategy adopted
by some HFT traders. In one intriguing study examining HFT trading
in the E-mini futures market, Professor Clark-Joseph notes that
strategic order anticipation can provide consistent gains. In a sample of
30 HFT traders, Clark-Joseph observed eight traders earn profits on
their aggressive orders in the markets. However, each of these eight
firms also lost money on their smallest aggressive orders, suggesting
that these small orders provided some informational "exploratory"
insight into the likely future direction of demand and market prices. By
obtaining private information through aggressive exploratory orders,
HFTs traded when their forecasted gain was large enough to justify
190. It is worth noting that almost ninety-five percent of limit orders on NASDAQ are
cancelled within one minute of being placed. The tactics might relate to other types of trades like
quote-stuffing or wash trades, rather than those motivated to seek out hidden liquidity. See
generally Nikolaus Hautsch & Ruihong Huang, The Market Impact of a Limit Order, 36 J. ECON.
DYNAMICS & CONTROL 501 (2012) (noting that a large number of cancelled orders can showcase
their importance as a means of deducing likely hidden orders in the market). But see Robert J.
Jackson, Joshua Mitts & Wei Jiang, How Quickly Do Markets Learn: Private Information
Dissemination in a Natural Experiment (2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2544128 [http://perma.cc/58X6-ZY4Y] (study observing that HFTs can take longer to
process fundamental information versus information with news value).
191. See generally LEWIS, supra note 25 (providing a fictionalized account of Wall Street
experts who seek to reform financial markets by eliminating the advantages HFT traders
currently enjoy).
192. Robert Jarrow & Phillip Protter, A Dysfunctional Role of High Frequency Trading in
Electronic Markets 3-6 (Johnson Sch. Research Paper Series, No. 08-2011, 2011) (describing
predatory and front-running strategies between HFT and other fundamental traders).
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aggressively entering the market.1 93 In another study analyzing the
impact of machine traders on transaction prices, Professors Cvitanic
and Kirilenko posit that transaction prices increase when a machine
enters the market. This price increase, they suggest, is unrelated to a
change in the fundamentals of the security and represents instead a
reflection of the machine trader picking off or "sniping" orders from the
top of the order book. 194
One can argue, of course, that fundamental investors will
remain committed to the market. Put differently, if they really wish to
buy and sell securities for a long-term investment, they will do so
anyway. The fact that the HFT might take some of the advantage may
be a small price to pay. HFT also appears to have reduced the costs of
trading for investors by supplying ready liquidity and reducing the fees
attaching to trades. This suggests a trade-off. Losing out to speedy
traders is a transaction cost, offset by the gains of a liquid, cheap
market. And indeed, some studies contest the negative effects of HFT
on fundamental traders, arguing that there is little evidence they are
being harmed.1 95
But other commentators have voiced considerable alarm at
increased participation costs that long-term investors contend with in
HFT markets. In one study of institutional trades in 120 stocks, the
author estimated that the average institutional investor was paying an
additional ten thousand dollars per day or more in transaction costs
because of HFT. The study suggests that these costs are higher on days
when institutional investors are large net buyers or sellers of a security,
implying that HFT activity increases in intensity when institutional
investors enter the market as large traders in a particular stock. 96
Citing these costs, a number of major investors have sought to take
193. Adam D. Clark-Joseph, Exploratory Trading 3 (Jan. 13. 2013) (unpublished manuscript)
http://www.nanex.net/aqck2/4136/exploratorytrading.pdf [http://perma.cclK5B3-RRRM].
194. Jaksa Cvitanic & Andrei Kirilenko, High Frequency Traders and Asset Prices 3, 14 (Mar.
2011) (unpublished manuscript) http://ssrn.com/abstract=1569067 [http://perma.cc/8KHA-HC7L].
195. For a review of the emerging literature on the costs of HFTs to retail and institutional
investors, see U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 69, at 29-31.
196. Lin Tong, A Blessing or a Curse? The Impact of High Frequency Trading on Institutional
Investors 2-5 (Oct. 2015) (unpublished manuscript) http://ssrn.com/abstract=2330053
[http://perma.cc/5E2Y-MT7J]. From an investor perspective, see Sal L. Arnuk & Joseph Saluzzi,
Toxic Equity Trading Order Flow on Wall Street, THEMIS TRADING 2 (Dec. 2008),
http://blog.themistrading.comlwp-content/uploads/2009/01/toxic-equity-trading-on-wall-street-
final.pdf [http://perma.cc/5KQN-U6XW] (arguing that investors are front-run by predatory HFT
traders); see generally Lewis, supra note 25 (arguing that the market is rigged); see generally
PATTERSON, supra note 43 (describing the rise of artificial intelligence systems for securities
trading and their effect on the global market).
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their business to trading venues free from competition from HFT
traders. 197
To be sure, HFT traders face costs in pursuing aggressive
strategies.1 98 They must have sufficient capital immediately on hand to
move ahead of informed traders, alongside the technology necessary to
best competitors. Yet, these costs are more than matched by the
potential gains. Not only can HFT traders send out volumes of dummy
orders at little private expense, but they also enjoy subsidized access to
intelligence in the market. Without having to invest in information
collection and its analysis, all the while benefiting from the gains that
accrue, HFT traders can vastly improve their bottom line. From one
perspective, they increase welfare gains by contributing to value
efficiencies. Through their activities, private information arrives
quickly into the market, more amplified in its impact than if the
informed traders were the only ones transacting.
However, the success of algorithmic traders creates serious
challenges for informed professionals. Constantly out-raced,
fundamental traders lose money over time. This raises the prospect of
fundamental traders waiting to make their important trades only when
they are sure that their gains are likely to offset potential losses to HFT
traders and others faster in the market.
In this context, fundamental traders may trade less often. They
may only trade when they have "big" news that is likely to generate a
significant profit, justifying transaction costs and losses to HFT traders.
Such informed traders may fail to trade on less significant, less valuable
information. Over time, this disengagement might lead informed
traders to either leave the market entirely or to transact on less
transparent venues. 99
With their profits reduced, information traders lose incentives
to participate meaningfully in the market. They can also end up with
weak motivations to invest in research and analysis of existing data.
With smaller budgets for research, the credibility of information traders
can also diminish. Eventually, as this dynamic plays out, algorithmic
traders can end up plumbing informational reserves that are actually
much shallower. Information in the market that emerges from this
197. Stephen Foley, Big Fund Investors Form New Dark Pool Trading Venue, FIN. TIMES (Jan.
19, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/372de622-a034-11e4-aa89-00144feab7de.html
#axzz3o7OfGQli [http://perma.ccl4CJR-Z68C] (discussing a trading venue made to respond to the
emergence of HFT traders).
198. It should be noted that some studies argue that the market is more liquid because of
HFT market-makers. For discussion, see Tong, supra note 196, at 3-4.
199. Id. at 2 (noting that institutions may move to trade off-exchange on so-called "dark
pools"). I discuss the implications of dark-pools in Section IV.2.
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interaction may be further away from fundamental value that benefits
how markets allocate capital in the economy.
Professional traders might actually face a quite perverse
temptation. It makes sense for informed traders to accumulate low-
quality intelligence to make gains where they can, knowing their
margins are likely to grow thinner over time. As more traders grow
motivated to disengage, understanding what their trading means and
its significance for capital allocation becomes an increasingly difficult
task.200
2. Implications for Capital Allocation
The costs of algorithmic trading on informed traders re-cast the
conventional dynamics underpinning market efficiency, as described by
Gilson and Kraakman. In their classical account, professional, informed
traders provide the driving energy for efficient markets. Their research
and insights percolate through markets as derivatively and lesser-
informed players seek to follow their lead. 201 With prices reflecting
fundamental information, markets can function more effectively as
reliable allocation mechanisms for capital.
In algorithmic markets, informed traders are giving away some
of their first-mover gains to "derivatively" informed HFT traders.
Derivatively informed traders can make gains through their faster
trading speeds. They also gain by freeriding on the research of specialist
informed traders. Rather than expend capital on necessarily
undertaking their research, derivatively informed anticipators can
maximize gains by investing in even faster, more accurate order
anticipation machinery.
These dynamics have implications for long term capital
allocation in markets. This Article has highlighted the information
losses arising from model errors and their impact on the ability of
investors to understand market fundamentals. Diminished gains for
informed traders in algorithmic markets can reduce their incentives to
deeply analyze the shortcomings of modeling uncertainties and to fill in
informational gaps. Alternatively, fundamental traders may perform
this function only when the gains from doing so exceed a monetary
threshold that justifies the capital expended, making such gap-filling
ad hoc. Interestingly, algorithmic order-anticipators are well-positioned
to analyze and correct for modeling errors in the marketplace. They
200. In finance theory, see Zhang, supra note 60, at 12 (arguing that HFT makes markets
drift further from fundamental values).
201. Gilson & Kraakman, Mechanisms, supra note 24, at 568-88.
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have an insider's advantage regarding state-of-the-art development of
models and the strategic behavior of expert, algorithmic traders.
However, specialist algorithmic traders, notably those transacting at
high speeds, have little motivation to correct for fundamental
informational gaps. Their horizons lie in the immediate future rather
than extending meaningfully into the future. On this basis, they are
unlikely to have strong incentives to utilize their knowledge to mitigate
some of the costs of using algorithmic models systemically in the
market.
This line of argument leads to further issues for capital
allocation. When fundamental traders face high, long-term costs in
algorithmic markets, either through investing in technology or order-
anticipation, their motivation to invest in oversight of capital may
diminish as a result. Undertaking monitoring and discipline of listed
companies imposes its own costs. Shareholders seeking to discipline
management confront a multitude of transaction costs beyond
monitoring managerial performance. Developing a strategy for
intervention, engaging advisors, organizing action, and implementing a
plan demands investment from engaged shareholders. If informed
traders confront lower returns, they may be less willing to invest in
meaningful governance.
There may, however, be an alternative argument. That is,
investors may become more circumspect about how they exercise
oversight of capital flows. Rather than staging potentially frivolous or
speculative actions, informed traders may seek to calibrate their
interventions more finely to have the greatest impact. Exercise of
discipline through the market for corporate control or through
shareholder actions may grow more effective as investors weigh the
costs trading against the benefits of exercising oversight of capital in
the market.
With this emerging evidence, classical accounts of allocative
efficiency and informed trading merit re-evaluation. Broader reflection
in this regard is necessary not only for understanding informational
gaps in markets and how these affect capital but also for developing
better regulatory policies about how capital should be governed.
V. CONCLUSIONS: PATHWAYS FOR POLICY
Thus far, this Article has demonstrated that algorithmic trading
problematizes a governing principle underlying regulation:
informational efficiency begets allocative efficiency for capital. With the
rise of automation, the straightforward relationship between
informational and allocative efficiency is in trouble. With systemic
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reliance on pre-programmed models and a changing, costlier climate for
informed investors, traditional paradigms underpinning allocative
efficiency are growing weaker, even if markets are more informative on
some measures, especially in the short-term. This decoupling of
informative and allocative efficiency raises difficult questions for
regulators. There are no obvious or easy solutions, especially as the
connection between information and allocative efficiency runs deeply
and pervasively throughout regulation.
Policy has long looked to market prices as a guide to matters of
allocation, to foster rules and regulations that create a robust
environment for overseeing those that use investor capital. Now,
however, the theoretical basis for these rules is no longer self-evident.
This Article does not aim to outline a new, normative framework for the
raft of rules that depend on the allocative efficiency of markets. Rather,
its goal is to highlight the problem that regulatory policy now confronts.
In looking forward, it is worth concluding with some observations about
pathways for modernizing traditional ways of conceptualizing capital
markets regulation to reflect the increasing automation of today's
markets.
A. Forging Better Incentives for Efficiency
Conventional accounts of efficient markets recognize that
private incentives drive traders towards the realization of a public good.
In other words, the motive of individual traders to profit from private
information or from the valuable information of other traders
eventually leads markets towards efficiency. Regulation has generally
sought to help these incentives flourish. Mandatory disclosure aims to
make information available to traders cheaply. A National Market
System encourages traders to enter markets to trade, lowering their
costs of participation.
As this Article shows, the usual force of these incentives is
shifting in automated markets. Informed traders are seeing their gains
eroded by HFT firms and competitive pressures, potentially reducing
their incentives to invest in fundamental research.202 In the meantime,
algorithmic markets motivate traders to expend capital in increasing
the speed and computational prowess of trading systems to enhance the
effectiveness of order anticipation strategies. 203 Laws have become the
unintended facilitators of these incentives to favor derivatively
informed traders over fundamentally informed counterparts.
202. See discussion supra Section III.C.2.
203. See discussion supra Sections III.C.1-2.
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Mandatory disclosure rules prime HFT algorithms to react to high-
impact words and phrases for short-term trading. When gains may be
made by deducing the immediate directionality of markets, rewards
from more fundamental, expensive analysis seem less compelling. In
addition, commentators note, NMS helps order anticipation strategies
to flourish. When traders can travel rapidly between exchanges in
search of the best order and search multiple exchanges for insights from
informed traders (e.g. through pinging), NMS appears to offer a helping
hand to derivatively informed anticipators. 204 In the aggregate, these
dynamics can eventually reduce the reserve of substantive, well-
reasoned intelligence at a cost to investors and market welfare as a
whole.205 In other words, private incentives to collect information may
no longer be as profitable and persuasive as they once were. Private
gains from trading may no longer translate as fully into the public good
of allocative efficiency.
If achieving allocative efficiency remains the goal of regulatory
policy, then its realization may be growing more difficult in algorithmic
markets. This calls into question the assumptions undergirding current
regulations and demands a fundamental rethinking about how
regulation may be better structured to incentivize research by informed
traders.
There are, to be sure, no easy solutions to the conundrum of
incentivizing informed traders to enter markets when they face costly
pressures to compete with HFT. For example, policymakers could
curtail the ability of HFTs to send out small "exploratory orders" that
signal an order anticipation strategy at work.206 But, this approach is
far from ideal-or even workable. For one, order anticipation by itself
is not a prohibited practice. 207 Speculating about the direction of future
orders constitutes a normal part of trading, one that is almost
impossible to limit for all practical purposes. It is also questionable
whether limiting the operational efficacies of order anticipation is
desirable. Given that scholars have extolled the benefits of HFT for
204. See, e.g., Clark-Joseph, supra note 193; Hirschey, supra note 60, at 1-2 (arguing that the
high speed of HFT trading and its resulting capture of informed traders' profits disincentives
informed traders from investing their time in in-depth research).
205. See discussion supra Section III.C.2.
206. See Clark-Joseph, supra note 193, at 3 ("[T]he private information about price-impact
generated by an HFT's small aggressive orders enables [her] to trade ahead of predictable demand
207. Order anticipation must be distinguished from front-running. Front-running is
prohibited. In front-running, a broker trades for her own account with knowledge of a pending
block transaction from a client likely to move the price of securities. FINRA, Rule 5270: Front
Running of Block Transactions, FINRA MANUAL (May 30, 2012), http://finra.complinet.comlen/
display/display-main.html?rbid=2403&elementjid=10860 [http://perma.cc/9LPB-SXTA].
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liquid trading, with easy entry and exit for investors, a cost on HFT
strategies is likely to face resistance from all corners of the market, not
just from the HFT traders themselves.
A check on the actual speed and flow of trading offers another
mechanism to help coax informed fundamental traders back to the
market. High-speed markets often reward the fastest trader off the
block. With a premium placed on speed, rather than knowledge, traders
possess powerful incentives to invest in the technology and
infrastructure needed to gain an edge on time vis-A-vis other traders.
Professors Budish, Crampton, and Shim argue, for example, that a race
based on speed alone is, for all intents and purposes, socially wasteful
and, according to the authors, a poor practical fit for the market. They
offer a trading model that requires traders to send orders out in batches,
not continuously. With traders forced to bundle orders for trading, their
idea lies in slowing down and organizing order flows.2 08 Arguably,
within this more controlled environment, informed traders can re-
assert their pre-eminence, freed somewhat from the pressure to
constantly compete on technology and speed.
Curtailing speed, however, also has its problems. In moving
forward with reform, regulators are likely to struggle with some basic
questions. How fast is too fast? Should the market punish traders that
innovate on speed and communication technology, an idea largely alien
to markets that have traditionally encouraged traders to come to
markets quickly with private information? And, will slowing markets
cause its own problems, for example, by forcing traders into
unregulated venues and markets at home and abroad and reducing
liquidity on public exchanges?
Finally, regulators may wish to ask whether informed traders
can benefit from more regular access to information from a reformed
mandatory disclosure regime. Theory posits that mandatory disclosure
helps informed investors to reach private information cheaply. By
accessing large reserves of information at low cost, fundamental
investors might better engage in research and analysis in relation to
the data that they receive. In automated markets, where informed
traders stand at a disadvantage to faster firms, expanding access to
information can offer a path forward that ultimately rewards informed
investors. With more information received more frequently, informed
208. Eric Budish, Peter Crampton & John Shim, The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race:
Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response 37 (Feb. 3, 2015) (unpublished manuscript)
http://faculty.chicagobooth.eduleric.budish/researchlHFT-FrequentBatchAuctions.pdf
[http://perma.cc/7HLE-KZ5G] (announcing the adoption of new rules intended to "ensure that
financial markets are safer as well as more efficient, investors are better protected, high-frequency
trading is regulated and speculative commodity trading is curbed").
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traders can carry out regular analysis and research into public
companies. To achieve this, a reformed regime might require that
mandatory disclosures take place more frequently. Information may be
disclosed in small segments at more regular intervals to supply a flow
of data to inform all traders. With their superior analytical skills,
informed traders should be well placed to transact with an in-depth
understanding of available intelligence.
This solution, too, is not without its problems. Critically, it
imposes a high cost on listed companies to supply regular disclosures to
the market. To solve the problem of allocative efficiency, such a reform
diverts the burden from traders to public companies that are forced to
reveal more and internalize liability for poor and inaccurate disclosures.
There is also little to suggest that such reform will necessarily produce
better analysis. Rather than offering a holistic picture of significant
data to markets, frequent disclosures might generate useless puffery,
noise, and extraneous detail that are not relevant for fundamental
trading.
B. Model Transparency
Alongside the costs to informed traders, regulators confront
pervasive challenges in interpreting and understanding the trading
algorithms that drive securities trading. Relying on advanced, pre-
programmed algorithms, markets face the risk that predictive trading
processes leave analytical gaps, make poor assumptions, or are
restricted by their programming in dealing with real-world markets.
Moreover, algorithms are unique to individual traders and constitute
tightly guarded secrets, making it costly for investors to understand the
frailties of modeling for the purposes of provisioning for them in
trading.
The question for regulators is whether to invest in remedying
model risk in some way. This first requires policymakers to determine
whether system-wide model risks are sufficiently serious for capital
allocation and governance to warrant attention. This Article argues
that model risks, given their pervasiveness in today's markets, can
influence how information is collected and processed in prices.
However, there is another perspective. It is arguable that model risks
are not new, and that today's algorithms merely represent electronic
versions of secret theories and methods long a part of finance. If those
risks have been left for markets to control privately, then concerns
about algorithmic model risks should be similarly set aside. There is
considerable appeal to this view, and the line between manual and
algorithmic trading methods is certainly a blurry one. However, model
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risks still present regulators with novel considerations for the purposes
of allocative efficiency.
For one, investors today face far higher costs to decipher the
basis on which algorithms devise their transactional decisions. As
discussed in the Article, the computational power of many algorithms
is without precedence, not only in terms of speed but also with regard
to statistics, quantitative analysis, and the volume of data collection.
These sophistications place costly demands on investors seeking to
decipher what is missing from the market in order to contribute to its
informational reserves. Presumably, investigating algorithmic model
risks and blind spots eats into the time and money that informed
investors already face. Indeed, these costs are probably prohibitive
given the secrecy and complexity of algorithms. In this context, simply
presuming that investors will decide how best to regulate modeling
risks is unsatisfactory. Further, given that informed investors have
traditionally been relied on to supply the market with intelligence and
also to extract intelligence for the purposes of capital allocation, this
gap is problematic for the market as a whole.
Also, as a theoretical matter, allocative efficiency has generally
concerned itself with reflecting information about fundamental value in
prices. Clearly, this goal is an ambitious one, as fundamental values
are, for all intents and purposes, impossible to achieve. However, looked
at from the longer-term perspective, algorithms are useful for
demystifying the dynamics of efficiency. With knowledge about the
models that are used, swaths of electronic trading data and knowledge
about the performance of securities, models offer a way to test our
hypotheses about efficiency. In other words, considered from a wider
lens, the rise of algorithmic trading has the potential to unravel the
market's operations like never before. Trading models showcasing the
assumptions, parameters, and valuation techniques combined with the
data generated by their operation offers a way to.examine how traders
interact in the real world and the product of this dynamic. Certainly,
models are predictive. Their performance may deviate from the
expectations of their human traders. However, their workings can still
offer insight into the economic and social welfare potential of markets
and trading. This learning also offers a way for traders to improve their
models and algorithms-and with this, it is conceivable, the better
allocation of capital within the economy.
These benefits point to the advantages of bringing greater
transparency to the models underlying algorithmic trading. Openness
can encourage both an appreciation of the major model risks in trading
and help regulators and traders to track the performance of algorithms
in the market. Regulators have expressed a desire to scrutinize
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algorithms as a way to prevent disruptions like the May 2010 Flash
Crash. However, their attention remains fixed on market stability,
rather than also delving into how algorithms relate to issues of
informational and allocative efficiency.209 Looking forward, it is apt to
also examine the feasibility of bringing transparency to algorithmic
trading and the manner in which to frame the goals transparency is
designed to achieve. Pushing for openness in algorithmic trading will
prove a challenge. Put simply, algorithms constitute the prize
intellectual property of their programmers and any attempt to reveal
these secrets will invariably prompt deep resistance. By way of seeking
to balance the demands of traders with the welfare goals of ensuring
allocative efficiency in securities markets, regulators will benefit from
developing strategies for transparency. For example, traders may
disclose their algorithms and models to regulators only. With a
compendium of the key algorithms and models in the market,
regulators may be well placed to consider some of the information gaps
and losses arising out of their collective use. Such general analysis can
offer insights, benefitting not just information investors but also traders
themselves. As traders innovate, without full knowledge of each other's
algorithms in the market, gaining an understanding of the evolution of
their common behavior becomes helpful for regulators. In this way,
informational efficiencies can come closer to the aspiration of optimal
allocative efficiencies in the market.
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, algorithmic trading has transformed securities
markets. It brings many advantages but also imposes serious costs on
the major function that securities markets perform: allocating capital
efficiently and productively across the real economy. The entrenchment
of model risks across the marketplace and pressures on informed
investors risk skewing the gains of algorithmic trading in favor of short-
term and more cheaply researched information. The implications for
regulation are far-reaching and profound, given the extensive reliance
that lawmakers and market actors place on prices as a proxy for
allocative insights. This Article represents a first step in drawing into
relief the significance of algorithmic trading for capital allocation. Its
ultimate goal lies in motivating deeper reflection about the prime place
of securities prices at the center of regulation and how best to invest
209. See, e.g., Press Release, European Parliament, MEPs Vote Laws to Regulate Financial
Markets and Curb High Frequency Trading (Apr. 15, 2014) http://www.europarl.europa.eulnews/
en/news-room/content/20140411IPR43438/html/MEPs-vote-laws-to-regulate-financial-markets-
and-curb-high-frequency-trading [http://perma.cc/6Y3M-E5TC].
1670 [Vol. 68:6:1607
2015] CAPITAL ALLOCATION AND ALGORITHMIC MARKETS 1671
regulatory resources in making markets meaningfully informative.
With markets set to grow ever more automated, this represents a
critical question for regulators building markets and the rules that
govern them for the present and the future.

